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ETTRODUOTION
Mora than thraa yaars hava alr.psad sinoa ths and of the'
Tsroi* brought forth a Icxga nuiiibor of accounts ra dating tto outar and
innar struggia against Hitlsr and his ragimap Soms of thasa rap'orts
tell an authantia story of ths actions of oouragaous rmn. Otliars aro
but fioticious and highly comniarciallizad thrillars or blunt lias
Goncaivadto axtricata thair authors and som3 of tlisir friands ffron
Just prison tarms or denazification difficulties.
The defendant VTjllZSAJGlCJSl told of his resistanco for the
first time in May and June 19.48 after he had been confronted v;ith
hundreds of docui-ients showing hin up as the Devil's State Socrotory
wlio had signed ovray the, lives and happiness of millions- of innocent
poopl3» •
Those acquainted Tfith criminal cases Imow that there often <
•eicist in largo murder gangs a few people -who for one reason or another
wahtod to get rid of tlie gang leadesfe or failed to concur with him in
some respects. This in no vray affect their guilt but nay have some
mitigating influonce if the resistance activity has actually resul
ted in blocking or seriously affecting the criminal activities of
blw gangt. WTIZSAJCIC3R himself has never claimed Ond could never claim
that his inner resistance against some of Hitler's methods dotorred
even himself in his v/ork as executive of Murder Incorporated which
Oatised tlie death of millions of liutch, French, Belgian, Polish, and
Hungarian human beings in German occupied areas# Among tliem Virero
Jev/s, Catholics, and Protestants - murdered as racially inferior, as
hostages, or as enemies of tlio state or done away vritii under soz^ve
' other mi-irderous program implemented under tlxe control ' or vath the
participation of Vf^IZS/^jJCOU,
Th3 trial briefs dealing with WJlZSAjJCEJlR's vrar crimes
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and crirus against humanity rsfor in datail to his numsrous signa
tures on such death v/arraiits» Thay bece: testimony on behalf of the
millions vdiora he dispatcliod to the dast and vfhcse tongues -wore si
lenced.
If, despite this deadly proof which the Defenso did
not dare to challenge, tlie Prosecution analyses-WillZSi^ilCKdR^s claim
of resistance at all it does so for two basic reasons:
1, The Frosecuticn wishes to help the Court in
finding out vrliether or not tliere really was ary .
concrete resistance actiwity on the part of
YTdIZSAJjCKdR "Which could be regarded as mitigating
circunstance»
Z* Th-e Prosecution wants to establish the historical
data whic]i night have some be caring upon tho evaluat*
tion of tl)0 degree of guilt of othjer defendants.
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iVjjPOSuH FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon full consideration of the facts and fictions surround
ing the Flea ol Resistance of -..SIZSADCISR the analysis of the
evidence in this brief leads to the folloiijing conclusion;
The defendant .ilZoAlCiu^R v;/as not engaged in resistance
activities.
1JEIZSA1;c;1I;R must be regarded as a man vjho felt himself called
upon to plSj sn important role in his countrya man vjho possessed'
the necessary jsisrsonal qualifications and aiabltion. Thus^ he
accepted the highest foreign Service position of the regime vjithout
hesitation in 193^^ at a time vjhen there coiiLd no longer be the
slightest doubt in his mind as to the cririiinal Ciic.i*auter of the
Hitler regiiie, -it may be that he vjould have preferred another
regime^ had another regime offered him still farther-reachiiig
influence, out since there T;as scarcely prospect of another
regime, he placod his experience and versatility unreservedly
at the disposition of iiitler and Ribbentrop and fulfilled his
diplomatic duties in line v.ath the official policy T'lith a clever
ness and skill far beyond the talents of Ribbentrop.
As an experienced diplomat he \<ne\i how to keep abreast of
a32 political currents and power groupings at home and abroad.
And sld-lled diplcroat tlmt he vas, he regarded it as opportune
to establish and maintain contacts vjherever he observed opposition
tendencies in C-ermanj'-, in order to v/atch the developments closelj?-.
Possi.bly he wished the opposition in Germany v/ell. But - and this
is the crux of the matter - he was not \.dlling to undertake the
slightest personal risk in order to support this opposition. Far •
more was his attention devoted to watching closely for any strength
coming to that opposition from other quarters. There is no doubt
that he would have been most gladly prepared, should the opposition
have achieved the elimination of Hitler, to have offered his serv
ices to the nevr government, but then only after the opposition had
securely established itself in office,
-3-
JInasmuch as and so long as there was no certain prospect
for a success of that opposition he continued to devote his
time and energies further^, in full d egree and vdth .full success,
to promoting the policies of the Third Reich,
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FciC3d ^vith ov3rvrlialming proof of his criminal activi-bias
uncbr tlu various counts of tho Indictmant tha dafondant TiiillZSAdCl'JR
o^ttarapts to construct an invol-vod cobi-Tab of vagua assortions -
sustaiiiad primcxily by witrussos daosasod - which runs urifi?T tlio
all^ngulfing titla of "rosistanco" •
" OB# I offarad total rosistancaj and in datail
I Wont to tlia vary nargni and fringj of my possi-
bilitias to offar rasistanca#" (Tr# paga 9,2Z8)
mth this pXsa TGXZSAJ0IC3R wishas to'datract tlio att3n-
tion of tha Tribunal from tha basic issuas of this law suit ploading
mitiration slmultanaously#
Harr von wJIZSi'^ ilOK'lR status that lia occaptad tho high
office of State Sjcr^tcry and ramainad tharain for five daoisiva
years in order to oppose and rosist tlia vary ragiira v/hich had put
him in that position of pov/ar and influanoa.
" o.B In tha intarestof rasistanca I ratainad ny
offica." (Tr# pagp 8539)
H3 claims, that in ordor to ranain in offica, ha had to
participata in and condom criminal activitias as a mattor of ca-
moufloga.. In ^TilIZ3i^^.;!GK5R' s mannar of nrguimntation - sustainad
witnessGS
l:y- narsonal friends vfhom !m has callad as dafansa/ - his rasi-
dasiro
stanca" is to be undarstood as tha overv/ha Ining/to praserva tlio
poaca or to ra-obtain it for Garrmny oftar Hitler's armies had bro-
lean it avarywliara« "Easistanoo" than, rs T'^ IZS/^dCKiIR intarprats
it in mitigation of his criminal activities consisted primarily of
the socrat spreading of the obvious gospeli "Peace is possibla
fv
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only Y/ithout Hitlor" 1), Ho did so by dovious noans^to a liraitod
group of frlands and associatoss*
Thus, Wi)I2S/i-ilOKdR stabod in his diroot oxamiiiation:
Qo "Thon it vrould suroly havo baon iioro suitablo to
giro up such an offico?
Ae "It v;ould havo boon moro suitablo if I had not be
lioY-od that in irsy offico I could do far moro for
poaco than I could havo dono on tho outsido#"
(Tr, pago 8097)
T1y3 samo sontiinsnt is oxprossod moro spocifically by the
dofondant sonowkat lator in In-s longthy diroct oxamination:
"I think that r:Ty ontiro emotivity can only bo undor-
stocd as anontity', as avdiolo. Undor a totalitarian
forn of govornr;i3nt, it is inpossiblo to carry or. and
v;ag3 wcor against tlio rogimo in all sphoros and in all
subjoct nattors Y:ith oqual forcoo As I said, ny strugg-
lo was djvotod to poaco, and it took all mjr strongth,
all tlio strongt]\ that I had availabloe In addition to
that, you havo to rorumbor ry v/ork for tho rosistarjco
novjrotit, and both tIios3 v/oro o.malganatod in oiyj
strugglo for poaco Y/ithout ilitlor ««« (ir, pago
854 6)
In connoction with tlio chnrgos of spoliation in Fra.nco
brou^it against him, "WJilZSASCKjlR usos tlio samo oxplanfttion:
my
" •,«<» ^"lay I o.dd that/oYm soIf-appointbd task was to
put an ond to th^ Y/holo thing, to holp bring tlYO vrar
to an ond, but not to try hopoloss or unsucoo sful
patching up of symptons and vra.sto nysolf in this nan-
nor^" (Tr, pago 3321)
Apparontly tho brutal and unprocodontod porsocution a.nd
oxtornination of nillions of Jovfs was, in "•llZSK^CYJR^ s ostiination,
•Iso a syraptom of tho war - dospito tho fact that an activo anti-^
Jewish policy vrc.s from its very initiation an intogral prxt of tlio
Hazi movomont vrhioh WiJIZS^iilCICdR sorvod and roprosontod.
1) soo diroct oxamination of vcn Itossol (Tr. pago 9553)
After tho wcx broke out, Ifr, von Woizsaockor omployod only
ono phrase or slogan which ho passod on to tho so rnmbors of t]-io
rosistraico movomont* This motto was: 'poaco is possible only
without Hitlor',"
-s-
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In respect to the Jewish problem he stated;
" ...As far as the ethical side of these incidents
is considered it is unnecessary for me to say a word
on that, but I knew that the awful development and
the course ttet was taken in the JeT/ish problem could
be stopped only by cne means, peace - that is a
peace eliminating Hitler, and it was this objective
that I centered on. In order to retain that sphere
of activity, in order to ^in that final and ultimate
objective, I have to permit documents to pass my desk
which in normal times I would have hesitated to touch
with ray own hands, you would not even touch them with
a mir of pliers(ir, page 8388)
" I think I have already nade this amply clear. As far
as I was concerned, it was always a higher aim and
interest'- which was of decisive importance; that is,
to work within the office in favor of peace and in order
to overthrow Hitler's regime, because without peace
and without the overthrow of the Hitler regime, the
Jews could not be saved anyway."
In addition to these astounding proclamations of inner
motives and " selfappointed tasks" the defendant, as will be sho\^n,
also wishes to establish that he collaborated closely and was even
connected with bona fide and known resistance groups.
Thus, "resistance" was, according to ^IZS?iEDKER, the
cne and only motive for his entire official activity durino the Nazi
period. However, these repeated assertions and the great accumulation
v
of statements and allegations presented by '.7EIZ.SAECKER's friends does
not make the actu'l nature of his alleged oppositional activity c
any more comprehensible. These varied and often controdictory claims
do not HBke a tangible pattern - they confuse the issues rather than
reveal truly mitigating factors, not to speak of intentions or even
actions which could tend to explain the tremendous hhstorical and
judicial guilt of this man.
In this brief , we shall try to analyze the factual con
tent of the defendant's claims in the light of 1he evidence before
this Court»
^6-
2a The Mab.iro of tlio Evidcnco
The Prosecution bases its case mainly on irrefutable docunonts found
in the fLles of the German Porcicn Office rcvealinrr the terrifying story
of countloss thousands of murderodj robbed^ and hur.iili?.tod people of an
entire continent , whereas Herr von VifEIZSAEGKER bases his ex'ta'avagant
defense claims almost entirely on the vague statements of a small group
of close friends, former subordinates and colleagues#.
It is easy to imdcrstand that resistance activities in a police
state are no matter for tlio r/ritton rocord^ HoiTevcT, it is less
conprehonsible why none of the ma.ny ivitnesses nor the defendant himself
have ever publicly mentioned Ernst von hllZS/iECKEIUs rcsistcnnco prior to
this trialp Surely, the fact that Hitler's esteemed State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs actually plotted the downfall of the regime represented
by him Y/ould have been a revelation, especially during the immediate
period after the war when a sliockod world opinion tended to hold the
entire Gorman people responsible for the atrocious crimes which were
committed in its namo# Prior to tee opening of teis case, a number of
r
bonks and articles had appeared on the Gorman rosistance -and a variety
of claims, often substantiated by prominent Allied diplomats, had been
r/.made by German suvivors# Yet, never before this trial was it ever claimed
that :^/EXZSAECICSR had more than a most remote and passive connection Y/ith
1)the anti-Nazi conspiracy^"
If this defendant was novor before this trial linked with the now
wc'll-known historical facts of the clandostine ciyosition to Hi tier wite-
in the Eeicr^ he obviously is now bent on utilizing these facts for the
purposes of his ovm defense. It is strange indeed, that von VHSIZSAECICSR
or his "resistance" group did not reveal a single new detail about the
l) Of four serious books vhich appeared after the v/ar on the German
resistenco but one mentions him onco. Teat is Fabian von Schlabrondorffs
"Tl-ioy almost killed Hitler", Schlabrondorff relates that" he visited
hTliZSidXKER in order to receive information as to the situation on -the
Eastern .fTont (p. 1|.2), No reforonce to VdlTZSAECICHR's resistance can bo
found in Dulles, "Germany's Underground", Gisovius, "To tlie Bitter Wd"
or Rudolf Pcchol's 'Deutscher Fidcrstand". The referenoos to VffilZS/iECKER
contained in tee (Uaries of Ambassador von Hassoll will be analyzed later
on in Rothfcls in "The German Opposition to Hitler"
ofers tn -.PJ^SAoCKER ti'dcc (pp, 60 and lk6) but only in connection
-7^
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German resistance but rather attached themselves meticulously to those
events and persons (alimys dcad)3 v/hose deeds are today y/ell-knovm to
students of recent German history. Neither did von VlilZSiLECKER mention
one yvord about his alleged resistonce activitios as witness before the
H'lT or to the Prosecutd^on in this case prior to liis indictment,
It is interesting to note, that the other defendants in this trial
yvho T/ere connected adth the Geman Foreign Office did nothing to support
-^IZS-xiCIQ.:R!s rosivstanco claims, but did, in fact, poltitely but armly
disassociato thonsolves from bfSIZSAECKEk's extravagant allogations, :ihis
holds true also of the defendantsEElDi-tlNNSDORFF, RITTEU,
STESNGIl.GHT and BOHLE who worked closely with "."SIZSASCKBR for a number
of years.
The record further shows that b'EIZSAEGKER while testifying on his
own behalf seemed to know far less of his own 'irosistance aciivitv"
than some of his dofonse witnesses v/ho constantly brought out now aspects
never nontionod by the defendant himself.
Iho 'tevolations " of Hitler's one timo State Secretary carefully
geared to well-known facts and only made as ho sta-nds accused, snack of
ox post facto Gons-cruction, of a falsification of history Tfhich can
only discredit the much discussed claim that thoro v/as such a thing as
a sincere, honest and really active Gorman opposition to Hitlor, is
Lo-d lansittart, who, whatever his political views dn regard to Germany
may be, is a British gentleman of the highest repute and who has been
for years in a singular position to observe dovelcpnonts in Germany, de
clared:
"An attempt is being made to build up an un
warranted legend, which in the interest of
history, must be refutod" (Pros. C-65 A,
T>i_ n/-,i \ 'NG-^786 ii., Doc, Bk, 20h)
Close analysis of the evidence prosentcd reveals that hHIZSAECKERis
'Vcsistance" legend is primarily propagated by a small but most co
herent group of minor officials of the Gorman Foroign Office, All these
mon ov/o their careers and promotions to the State Secretary von '•'SIZS..ECKER
and wore^ like their chief faithful servants of Hitler's Reich to tho
bitter endt
^a-Ofr"
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It is of interest to the student of criminal cases how this snail
group has banded together in its efforts to fortif3- a n^rth of ^7hich they
alone benefit to the detriment of the najority of Ihoir countrymen "who
endeavor to restore the confidence of the -world in a better Gemany,
Garofully plannedj their affidavits and testimony corrobato and confirm
each otdier, thus spinning a cobweb•to, the end of obscuring their own
collaboration with Nazism and the guilt of a man vdth v/hcse prestige
and standing they feel bound to identify themselves. Studying the
numbvor of affidavits each of those men gave to the other, one cannot
help but havG the impression that this group wishes to lift itself out
of the mud into which they follov/od Hitler by its own bootsstraps as
the legend ascribes it to Baron lixmchhauscno In order to show the
real nature of the mutual insurance association of affiants, the
Prosecution has called tiie most prominent for cross-Gxanination, Ihe
result made it clear that those affiants supported each other through
affidavits given for denazification purposes, exchanged affidavits
for mutual information, and used similar methods known in many domestic
criminal cases.
The attached chart shows, that one 6f this grouj;^ defense affiant
Herr von Nostitz, admitted to have issued 35 o.ffidavits in exchange for
9 end that ho had discussed his prolific output with the witnc>ssos von
ICcssel, Erich Kordt, von-^tzd^rf, Siegfriedi and others (Tr. page 18424.)
The witness Sonnleithner admitted giving "about two dozwn affidavits",
far exceeding the group which, of coHroe> helped him speedily through the
ST)ruchk^mm:?r (Tr. page I8480). Herr von Bintelen stated that he H^hought
it his dr.ty"to execute affidavits for his former collegues (tt. page 17.559).
Thie is not the plao.e to study the history of the Kordt claim of "re
sistance" by having warned the British- 'cvernment prior to the Munich
agreement. However, while Kordt had often before asserted that he ac-fced
"on behalf of the German opposition" it was not until this trial that he
claims to have acted with V/ElZS^lSaKIR'b crneent,. It is known that the
Kordt brothers also executed a staggering number of affidavits in ctrier to.
help.their colleagues before the courts.
In addtion. Ken* von sUnimoned
in his defense a numoer of persons who may justly be
called survivors of the Dona fide Gerim-n resistance and
widows of active participants who were executed by the
GestapoV This brief will deal with the actual facts con
tained in these aifidavits and teste'monies in their pro
per, Ho\jever, an attempt to find an explanation for the
phenomenon! as to why proven anti-Nazis have gone to the
very limits of stretchijag the truth to make sta^ments on
behalf of seems part of the analysis of the
evidence as such.
The Prosecution is not lacking in reverence
and sympathy for these valiant women whose husbands lost
their lives Decause they, too, fought Hitler. They fought
Hitler from the inside, v/ithin the totaliticirian state, -
a oattlefield no less dc^rigerous tha^n that on which tens
of thousands of Allied soldiers gave life and limb.
However, the very nature of that struggle
against totalitarianism in which these men engaged made
discretion and utmost eaution imperative- Here lies the
great difficulty in truthfully assessing the historical
facts of that struggle - these facts, the ever guarded
names of their associates and secret contacts, the very
extend of the conspiracy - quite frequently died with them.
Those matters had to be kept even from one's spouses and
dear ones; from them in particular, for they would be easy
prey for the Gestapo and its cruel methods to extract
information. 1) An now ,for the first time ,these widows
claim to have known it all t
1) .m/-.Sa1X:KiR*s own son testified to this effect; in re
gard to his father's rel.;tions with the resistance move
ment ha said: "Details about actions in that field were
not told me b^ him oacause we did not want to incriminate
each other by knowing what the other did." (Tr. page
10033)
^10^*
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Tho motive for their readiness to rally
to the defense of '•••/^IZSA5?CK:n^( - and this also applies to
such survivors of the German resistance who have testi
fied for the defendant - c.an ha explained by the-psycholo
gist rather than the l,;wyer or historio.no ' TlZSrtl?CK"^j
by virtue of his uackground, -and upbringing, is being
considerad a man of . integrity in certain German circles®
Could it be that those who likewise belong to that parti
cular group of unaoubtedly honest patriots feel accused
themselves -and desply hurt by the charges brought ag.iinst
this m-an? Since they will not grasp that one of their
own social set lent himself to cover and participate in
the vulgarities of the mad paperh.:.nger, his actions are
being rationalised as having stemmed from the clandestine
inner motive of secret opposition. Hera is a straw for
their comprehension. j\n6. every personal association, each
casu.,1 word of complaint about the difficulties' of the
work of the State Secretary, now - in retrospective
wishful thinking - is enlarged and interpreted as
"resistance''.
In addition the follov/ing should ho kept in mindj
III contrast to Riohontrop's hrusque, arrogant and even crude
nanncrs. s smooth, conciliatory, and diplomatic
hearing has caused numc'rous persons to v;rongly assume that this
exterior meant more than tochnique, namely, a basic difference
with the Poroign Minister in political views and political activi-
tioss
The best evidonoo that this was not the case is
s record, his sigraturo under the most horrible
documents, and not infrequently, his reports containing cynical
comments or self-congratulations on his success in deceiving
the partners to diplomatic conferencos or conversations, through
this techn-iquo of manners. {See trial brief covering crimes
against tho peace)
. '-if.
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standards .rt.iv.jlied iii Aaalyaiii/^ th^ lihrXdence
In order to analyze the defendant's "resistance", this brief
';Vill let itself be guided by three prerequisites v/liich are con
sidered as vital as thejr are obvious for the internal struggle against
the totalitarian Nazi regime. 2ven though these prerequisites are
nov/here specifica3.1y set dovm by students of the German resistance,
they are recurrenuly implied and historians will agree, that those
courageous Germans, vdio justly claim to have opposed the Hitler
govem.'ient and suffered because of it, have been possessed by them.
These three prerequisites are:
1) A political philosophy, v;hich, whatever it ma;" be, is
clearly and honestly opposed to the phi].osophy aiii
ideology of Nazism.
2) Active intent to remove Nazism froru pawer and influence
by revolutionary action or active participation in,
incitement to, or preparation for such action. This
wouldusually, if not necessarily^ include political
planning or preparation of a policy v/hich is to replace
tiie removed one.
3) Active prevention and/or sabotage of such measures and
propaganda I'fhich riiade Nazism what it is.
1 A good many if not all members of the historically acknowledged
resistance groups in Germany a3-so considered it a bitter necessity
to hasten the defeat of their countiy in Vifar because they arrived at
the conclusion that only Gerr:iany's military defeat could bring
about tlris collapse of Hitler's regime#
..
'J;
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"•'j'SIZS.ASGFISR's political philosopliy
No clear indico,tion of •'iEIZSAECICER's political philosophy
can be discornod from his testimony or that of his friends o He
vdshes it to be understood and considers it a matter of course
that ho detested Nazi practices^ ("oe« it is unnecessary for me
to say a word on that"^ Ti*. page 8588), But what he indicates of
his views in a positive sense docs not support any indication of
ideological opposition to the Nazi regime.
At the very beginning of YJEIlSASCKER's direct examination ho
lordo some sta.tomcnts which apparently are to bo token as his politi
cal credo:
"I didn't prefv.r any constitution. A constitution,
as far as I am concerned, is not a confession of
faith. I imagine that a constitutional monarch is
that v/hich lies closest to the German chara.cter«
But as a civil servant, one docs not S3rvc a con
stitution, but the Fatherlands ) One serves which
ever government and constitution is given to the
country by the pooplo. 2)if 7595)
The following day the defendant s^.ve a further clue as to his philo
sophy:
principle and alsc; my political confession of
faith has rd'ways boon that I should not intorfojTo
with destiny axy more than nocossaiy; that is, tiiat
evcrytliing that is good and capable of life shoulld
be allowod to gro;/ without interference and tlio way
should bo cleared for it. That is obstacles should
bo removed, friction should be removed, and para
sites should bo removed, and ^voods should be up
rooted, and then we should let evcrytiiing else look
after itself." (Tr, page 7711)
This hardly sounds as the political conviction of a man who risked
his life in secret resistance. The fact that ho applied this passive
philosophy of "laissoz fairo" to Na.tional Socialism is - inadvertent
ly - admitted by himself:
1) This sentiment was often oxprossed by the late Dr, Goebbels in
bcriding the Weimar Constitution which the Nazis dostroyodo
2) This tacit admission that Hitler's was a populary elected govern
ment is in contrast to the historical facts as presented in this
casoo
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whother or not one v^as enthusiastic
.. lonal Socialist ideas," (Tr^ page 8095)
In his direct cxoiuination !iEIZS.\lCIC:a testified on thi tension
^ting betvroen Gorrci-any nnh Svdtzerland by reason of tl^ persecution
of the churches .•^nd fV\r- • . . .
^no discrimination of the Jews which was practic
ed by the country vidch he lOirosontod. He stated:
Pbotit Hf ^ could do anything fundamental
nn-i- n " myself in ny personal relations, did
to criticize Jev/s and churciimen*"Ur. Pago 7601)
the mm who nav claims to have been connected with
persons .Yho advocated the violent overthrow of Hitler, was, according
to his o.vn testimony, appalled by violent change or oven revolution*
Ids son, the physicist, Karl Fricdrich von Woissaockor, cites a
remark wldch his father made to hm:
He ^eid to me at the beginning of the war - aid
quot^g literally: 'My ovm father said on the
first nf AurmoJ- ..n,, . . ...n> , _ -V • • WKKii XLiUllWi. "-/ii OiLJ
• M I9I4 "Tliis V7ar v/ill ond with a rov-o u ion ; I foar that thi wa will e oven worse',"
Cfr. pa.go 10021)
The tenor of such a passive attitude runs throughout his testimony
and more quotations uo this effect mil be cited in this brief in sub
sequent contexts,
iIEIZS^lECICER's lack of political judgement quite evidently stems
from the lack of political conviction, at least vis a vis the Nazis,
fhus, tilGlZvjiUiiCiHRj according to the tcstimorQ'" of his friend, Erich
Kordt, supported the symbol of Gorman nationalism, Field Marshal von
hindcnburg and thought that the Nazis would bccomo more moderate after
tiioy had attained pov/or over Germany:
He thought by a combination of inside and outsido
orcos a gradual chang:: might be brought about in
the suructuro and ho thought that the officials
shoidd all bo on the alert and should try to do
their best." (Tr. pa.g^ 732I)
It is quite evident from his ov;n testimony that at first,
IffillZS.'iEGIlilR failed to sec the rcvolutiona.ry character of National
-ll^-
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Socialism but once it became appaxent was willing to condone and
oven support it in line vdth his own cl:iauvini3tic aims for a greater
1)Gcrjiiau.y• One of his remarks v/liich wore recorded in the diaries
of the murdered ambassador von Hassoll boars witness to this
attitude* On Hay 24^ 1940 Hassell wrotes
"Since National Socialism^ as it has now developed^
is completely souUossj its intrinsic creed being
powcr^ vje shall get a godless nature^ a dctermanized,
culturoloss Germany, .ind perhaps a Europe, conscience-
loss and brutal*
iJElZSfkEGICER thought thore w.as some consolation in the
knowledge that very often in history great transforma
tions have boon wrought by criminals.*,."
(NG-5759, Exhibit 288 Doc Bk no 204a)
/inother indication of the cfefendant^s attitude during the Nazi
period is gained from a. personal letter vfhich he "wrote to the German
ambassador in Japan, Ott, in Hay 1940:
"If the daily routine or even artificially piled up heaps of
paper did not keep us busy, we would for the moment
be rather unemployed. For every forward step that the
AXiaQ'" is j;iaidjag in the V/est is far more significant from
a foreign policy point of view tlian .anything that we could
ever accomplish i»vith our pen -jid paper work... (NG-5406,
Exlaibit 3608 D.oc Bk No. 97G)
Tills is a personal letter to a trusted friend who according to V/EI2SAECK.
mha own testimony (Tr. p. 10180) vfas not a Zizi. Hho letter certainly
v/as not written to irapress .anyone vid"bli Nazi torminology or to comouflague
tho vxitors' true feelings.
Nowhere throughout tho defendant's testimony-or that of his
friends can we read that he ever attempted to dissuade anyone from
folloidng Nazi doctrimcs or policy or that he ever tried to win anyoaa..
oa'er to the cause of the anti-Nazi opposition, which he claims to h.ave
represented. On the contrary, TOZSAEGKER'S public speeches and
utterances closely follovrnd the Nazi party line.
In contrast, tho actual members of the resistance saw their main
1) I^iEIZS.USCKER's scurrilous and nation-olistic language in regard
to Poles and otiier "traditional eneioies" of Germany revealed
itself too frequently daring the course of this trial, both
in documents and his own testimony to be cited here in detail*
Thus, during his ovjn testijnuiiy he referred to "Polish arbitrary
acts*., of a Fascist ch-aracter" (Tr. page 7746) cuid "Polish
excesses and breaches of contract*.*" (Tr. page 7750)
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task in attempting to win support among their countrymon and in
opening their eyes as to the true nature of NationoJ. Socialism,
Both the witnesses von Schlabrendorff -nd von dem Buscho emphasized
this aspect of their activity (Tr. page 10972), Von dem Busche
claiins that the State Socrotoxy, in a public speech before 100
young officers in Potsdam in the spring of 1942^ once implied that .
"the foreign policy of Hitler v^ould not lead to negotiations with
foreign povjer vdiich would preserve the state" (Tr, page 10975),
It must be remembered that the German officers never wonted to
negotiate until taeir entire country v^as overrun in May of 1945-? As
is well knovnaj they believed firjidy in "final victory" and were
indoctrinated with the creed that if Nazism was to step dov/n from
the vrorld scene not only the German state but all of Germany should
also be doomed,
I'JiijiZSj IGK-jR^ who now claims ho had to remain in office in order
to give information to the secret anti-Nazi resistance, did not do
anything to enlighten his ovjn friends about the criiiiinal aspects of
Nazi policy, Tlio cross—examination of Theodor Kordt revealed that
"t'JP-lZC/iECKEU did not give him any advance information on Nazi plans
for aggression - notably the invasion of the Western countries in
May 1940 —or njiy information that could ha-ve been used to strengthen
the of the anti—Nazi resistance such as the deportation of the
Jews or tho atrocious activities of the Einsatzgruppenj. (Tr, pages -
12300 - 12305)0
iten in tho spring of I940, Bishop Bergrav of Oslo came to see
'l(JElZ3..nl3KjH on a peace r:iission, the State gecrettaiy allegedly
expressed his distaste of the Nazi regime and, the horrors of w.ar.
Despite that he did not see fit to draw the only consoquentia]. con
clusion from such an attitude to inform the Norwegian that a Gerruan
snoak attack against his country.
-16-
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was planned wittin a few (Tr, page S^kO)
The undisputed fact that Bishop Bcrgrav called on ^®)I23;JEC!KER in
March 1940 is again confirmod in an cffidavit by the Right Roverond
Bishop of Chichcstor., George K« Bell^ introduced by Defense in rebuttal
as Exhibit 454 (V>ElZS:Ji:ciCER Docuinent 497 Doc Bk No, 9. The affidavit
states in this connection merely that VIEIZS;J5CKER "accoptod it (the
peace proposal) for use as a possible means of peace talks,/^d
hero the story ends® Neither the affiants nor the defendant himself are
able to t;sll us vrfiat was done .about the peace proposal of these chorch—
meno Obviously, the reason is that nothing at all was done by
1'JEIZS;1KKER beyond having accepted a document on behalf of Hitler* s
government which at that time was still making efforts to come to terms
with England as is evidenced by Hitler's speech before the German
Reichstag of 6 Octobgr 1939,
.'ilElZB.DCKEE's lack of consistent political attitude is also
emphasized by the fact that, despite the recurrent and accumulative
statements as to the reasons why he remained in office, he d'id or so he
states, offer to resign repeatedly:
Question (by Dr» Becker): "But as you yourself purport,
you several times offered your resignation?
.\nswer (by V'iEIZS^iHJICER) s "Yes, I did, simply in order
to m-ake it clear that I was serious in cy opposition to
Hitler's policy# That was necessary.as a demonstrative
act of protest." (Tr, page 9441)
Or, did we not hoar ad infinitun that the State Secretary's
Nazi activj.ties, spcochcft, rxid oven his SS-mcmbership vrere means to
camouflage his resistance? vSpooking about the SS unifom ho stated:
•'Perhaps I might have worn this uniform in order to
serve jy political intention rather more effectively,
but I did not do it and I just could not face wearing
such a uniform as comouilage•»" (Tr, page 7699)
9
1) .According to ;Hon Dulles (Op. cit., p,. 59) and other
sources a number of G^^rman .nnti-Nazi conspirators thought it
their higher patriotic duty to warn the Norwegians (-and later the
Dutch and Belgians) of the impending Nazi invasion.
2) "Dokui^ente der deutschen Folitik" Vol VII, Part 1 p, 36)
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/Clo£!o study of ViElZS/dilCICIlR's tostinoay nd. that of his friends
rove-il hiiu as a nan^ who^ concurrent vdth his lack of reaa conviction^
is oxtreniely concerned vdth his ov/n
personal safety® He constantly oiiiphasizos and rationalizes^ the need
of being covered in eveiy direction - he has lils rooms checked for
secret nonitoring devices (ViElZS.JiCKER Document 337^ Eriiibit 257 p.B,5) «
and ais statements a.rc always so guarded as to be open to any number of
interpretations. It was fear of indiscretion and the resultant danger
to nii.iself v/nicn caused his quarrel with aiubassador Hassell. (NG-
5759> Exhibit C-2SS Doc Bk 204a).
In spite of all aJLleged difficulties which ''iElZS/i^CKER claims to
have had with his minister von Ribbentrop there is no evidence that
there was ever an open, clear rift between the two men. Tlio saJ:io is
true of course^ of his relationship with Hitler hiaself viho - suspicious
and erratic as he was - vrauld have hardly permitted ViElZS^U^CICDR to
remain in nis high office pnd^ Ir.ter^ to represent him at the Vatican
until the end hao. he not trusted him cojipletely.
At the ovo of tne second 17orld vfar^ vfhcn the invasion of Poland
was iivaenent^ ffilZd'^ CIiER made a statcjuent to his son who asked him
why he didn't appeal to Hitler as a last attempt to prevent the
cat;\strophoj
however^ if I tell him tho truth^ naraoly that ho
destroys his own Reich if he starts a war, then he
Q-'^ y thinks I nn (Tr. page 10020*)
This man claii;is that ho wa.s convinced that this Wrar would develop
into a world conflagration^ that Gormviy <uid tho very essence of
Europe ^uld be destroyed... he holds all the factual md reasonable
ax'gui^ents in nis hands - but is afrcid that a man viion ho claims to .
have despised may think him a coward. No otho?;- than that very
designation c.an be said to fit® .ind this is hardly consistent with
the stamina .md courage required of a nan of the "resistcjico",
.ffllzaJX^KER'3 complete un^.villingness to use his pov/e-r and
influence to alovlo.te tho cruelty .nd h:,rdship of tho system .vhich
-18^
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he reprosuntGd oven in individur.1 instances of persons Icnom to him
is illustrated, in on affidavit by Dr» Johannes LiGchtcnstoin (NG-
3053j Exhibit C-287 Doc Bk 204A)« Drs Liechtenstein relates in detail
hovf VJEIS.VECKER refused to involve himself in any way in aiding a
Czech nationalist ^vho was once useful to the No.zis but was subse
quently charged vdth resisting the Nazi authoritioso
The incident reported by Liechtenstein is not surprising in
view of the jiany documents vrfiich indicate the brusque and callous
manner in which VJEIZSiiECKER rejected the nunsrous humanitarian appeals
on the part of Lo-tiU-./jaericoji neutral diplomats and of the Papal
Nuntio
l/EIZo.'^CKEH's coiuplete disregard of huj-ian suffering ojid the
horrible realities of the Nazi atrocities are indicated by his
f
statement that he could not remember whether or not ho had read the
§J
bloody Einsatzgruppon reports oven though he acknc^lodges his initial
on most of thonio (Tr» page 857S)« The obvious fact that these sadistic
accounts .?.re bound to bum thomselvos upon the mind of any humanly
responsive person is evidenced in the record by the spontaneous remark
of the defense witness Bruns who, asked about the Einsatzgruppen reports
oxclairaod:
'♦No, I renenber thorn so well and I shall never forget then". t'V,
(TI o page 18469) , • '
In fact, it is hard to see how VJEIZS/XCICER actuplly expects us to
accept as facts his oft-alleged "resistance" activity. For his own
a
accounts quite frequently reveal /most detached attitude even on matters
of the clandestine underground struggle. Thus he replied to the legi-
tiiaato question of his cross—examiner as to whether he over con
tributed jioney or goods to the resistance groups; "I don*t think sOn,,
I don't know, but you must ask my wife." (Tr# page 9237)
1) See Exliibit I465 (NG-40CCL, Doc Bk 50); }jbchibit I467 (NG-
4864, Doc Bk 50); end Jibchibit I469 (NG-4862, Doc Bk 50).
2) See .&±iibit I468 (NG-451S), Exhibit 2133 (NG~1757)j
Exhibit 2136 (NG '^4459)> >tciiibit 2140 (NG-4533)> Exhibit
a41 (NG-5004); Exhibit 21/^5 (NG-4444)> Eichibit 2152 (NG-
4569), Exhibit 2155 (NG-4572).
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*'®lZSiji£)KjilR and i.iost of his frionds^ aithough professing to bo
onorjies of tho Nazi crood arc talking about the horrid Nazi
atrocities as though they were nerely on paper - providing an
interesting basis for laore or less congenial arguments on the
baai.e for j^iore or loss congenial arguments on the meaning and
interpretation of documents - as though in fact no massacres and untold
suffering had ever tal^en place in grim reality.
If \iiElZ3/j5CKER revealed himsolLf at all in tho course of his
cefonae, he revealed hijusolf a.3 a man without any firm ideological
basis who accepted ovon the most cruel manifestations of Nazi
Ideology in order to better serve the State of Adold Hitler. If he
had any misgivings on certain consequences of Hitler^s foreign
policy they did not and could not consolidate into the firm creed
essenti-al to the revolutionary or political conspirator. For not only
does oEIZS.XClCER lack dotcrr.aned and spiritual negation of totalit
arian concepts^ iiis very deeds revealed him as cynically cold and
devoid of the human ideals v/hich alone could inspire genuine resis
tance to the evil that was Nazism, His complete inner identification
with his job of a diplomt may have lead hij:i on occasion to inform
himself on the opinions of forces other thrm those which he served#
But even n.i.s most personal associations were entirely detemined by
diplomatic and political considerations and subordinated to,the aims
of the State which he served so wello
45* Relationship to Bon/.. Fide Resistr.noe Groups
"iVLilliiSAJCKiiR's "resistanoj" olain is primarily based on the
foot that li3 Inuvr and was aoquainbed vdth a number of the people -vdio
were subsequently persecuted or killed by the Nazis because of their
opposition to the Nazi regime. Tine defendant statedj "The main
people in the (resistance) movements knew that; they were in touch
v/ith me'', i.s regards the "main people", we' are constantly presented
with tlxe 5 03in nr.me s i
"That is I was in touch with General Beck, General '
Hrdder, the collaborators of Ganaris, Golohel Oster,
a certain Herr von Dohnanyi, State Secretary Planck,
Professor Albrecht Haushofer, Jr., and many others#"
• (Tr. pages 7704-7705)
As to "tlTe many others" we learn e Isewhe re in the transcript of
" .. i"linister Popitz, the Prussian Finance
'{inister ~ who, by tlie v,-ay, also become a victim
of the later plot cn Hitler's life ..." (Tr. page
7917)
Tlie vjltneso, von Kessel, further mentions
" .«oPc.'iulenburg and York he saw frequently and
Schwerin tco.o(Tr. page 955t;)
Furthermore WJIZSAjJK^jR v;-as, vn ore told time a?id again, in
contact with i.mbassador Ullrich von Hassell and Ambassador Count T/iforner
von der Sohulenburg wlio wore both later victims of the bloodbath
folloTd.ng the abortive putsch of 20 July 1944.
V/dlZS^dOlCjjR*B secretary. Dr. Herbert Siegfried, also states in
his affidavit (W.5IZSAjCKilR Document 337, ilxli. 257, DoOc Bk. 5) that
a nijimber of persons later convicted on charges of conspiracy
against Plitler came to see the State Secretary repeatedly duriiig
his tenure of office. However, he was not able to make any state me nta
as to tlie nature of tloe conversations which took place#
Considering their official positions, it becomes at once obvious
why tlie State Secretary in the Foreign Office should know them and
^a-
dl.-
lit-iro conijinuous offioicil ro Iciijions v/i'th. "bhjni wliicli tnciy" hcivo ^ on
oooasionj also mo.turod into closer personal ralationships. As will
ba dascrlbad latar, all thasa conspirators hold official positioiis
in tha Third Raich. Tha Anti-Kazi conspiracy vms not a full tima
Job - tha official dutias and contcjcts oontinuod. And for ona
parson, Tidiom V^lZSkAOlUiB. knavr, vdio latar provod an activo Anti-Nazi,
a nundrod parsons Gould obviously be nairiad v/ho waro in ovon cIosgt
contact and w^ro ardant followors of Hitlar, not axcapting Eaydrich
of tha Gasto>,po or Eorniann with whom ha hotd a continuous and ploasant
official rolationship,
iJli:IKSjVjIOKJR raconstructs intimata contacts v/ith a nunibar of man
•vdioso conragsouB attampt to ovarthrow tha laacbr of tha Nazi stato
was rowardad by a crual daath - but thasa avants took ploca at a tima
whan iGIZSAjIGKjIR was sofa bahind tlia marbla walls of Vatican Oity,
AS his main "contact man" with tlaa "rasistonca" tha dafondant
ola.ims tlio raystarious ohiaf of tha German Oountar-Intalliganco
Sarvioo (Abwahr), Admiral WiHiahji Canaris. In timas of war it is
not unusuo.l that tha Stato'-SdCrotary in tha Foraign Offico should
ba in continuous contoct with tha hand of tlia Military Into lliganco
Sar\icao And tha fact, that thaso Contacts wara cordial is oxplainad
by th_o provarbial curiosity of tha admiral ns wall as by tha foot,
that thasa gantla^iian, according to Wj!I23Aj;cm's tastimor^y, know
aoch other wall from thair timas as NaiTy officars^ Obviously, thaso
contacts would also axtand to tlia Intalliganoa chiaf's aidas and
particularly to Dohnanyi "vdio is closaly ralatad to tlia ona tima
intalloGtual alita in Garmany from vdiich tha dafandant himsalf stoms.
Tha avldanca prasantod by tlx? dofansa shows olaorly that tho
contact botwaan 'ffdIZs/.JCm and Qanaris was ontiraly on official
tarms, Tha affiant Gottfriad von Nostitz ("WilZSAilCKilR Doc# 269,
ilxh. ^67, Doc. Bk, 5) statas that this contact, as wall as tha oon-
tcct with Gbnaral Haldar, was ostablishad "for tha purposo of mutual
information" and usually maintairod through tha Sootion for Military
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Affairs iri the Foreign Office. Iirhen the head of that Section, von der
He7den-R;ynsch, was later on transferred, this contact continued to soue
extent throu^i personal visits by Canaris and his aide, Lohnanyij, And
Erich Kordt states: "There was even a special official apipinted to keep
contacted." (Tr^ pp. 7350)o
One of the few surviving members of Admiral Canaris' circle, Erwin
Lahousen, also confirms "that there was cooperation between Canaris and
SAEGICER". Canaris, according to Lahousen, kept VJEIZSAECICER informed about
actual developments in the various theatres of war. He also informed VffilS-
SAECICER about the many other projects and "enterprises" of the military and
political leaders of the Third Reich of viiich we had learned^..WEIZSAECKER
on the other hand, allegedJ.y emphasized reports from abroad to the effect
that there would be no peace with Hitlero
If there was ever a modern case of Dr. Jelcyll and iir. I^srde, it is that
of the "littile Greek", the Gliief of Hitler's ItLlitary Intelligence Service.
For the man who organized the Nazi Fifth Columns, who, in the last war, in
troduced the weapons of murderous sabotage, secret infiltration, and sent
German soldiers on death missions also, so we are told, permitted individual
officers of his organization, knovaa as "AbsT/Thr", to plot against the regime.
This sr-range fact was first revealed by General Lahousen during the trial
of Goering et al, before the IMT on 30 November 1945» Essentially the same
facts are made kno^vn to this Tribunal in -the first affidavit by Erwin Lahousen
VvEIilCAECICE'.R Docujxent /|.6, Exhibit 272.
The nature of Canaria^ resistance to Hitler were revealed by Lahousen
before ^>he DJT in the follovdng words:
Q.- (by Colonel Amen) "What was the purp^jse of the
group to whicn you belongod; that is Canaris' inner
circle?
A. (by Lahousen) "On its political motives or aims,
I was not iri'orinede I can only reiterate the
thoughts and considerations \vhich I, since I was
ore of Canaris' most intimate confidants, knew well.
His inner attitude, which influenced and moulded
not only liy ovjn actions but also those of other
men whom I mentioned can be described as follows;
"We did not succeed in preventing thi war of
aggression. The war implies the end of Germany and
of ourselves, a misfortune and a catastrophe of veiy
great extent. However, a misfortune even greater than
f^his oa.tastrophe v/oiilu be a triumph- of this system. To
pr-j-vent this by a.3.1 possible' Jiibansyyas the ;ultimati.e aim
purpose of our struggle," (luT,Vol,ll, p,"' 444)
i
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The difference "between the "basic attitude of Ton WEIZSAJIGESR and that
of Canaris is striking^ ^iZSASCKSa o^bviously did not go along v/ith his
friend Oanaris. To wits
("by Dr. Becker) "Kov: in the meantime, did you
try to sa"botage and v;ork against military prep
arations in d-ermany for the Bnssian carpalgnY
A. ("by TJEIZSASGKEH) "ITo, of course not, "because I
woTold never have had an idea of sabotaging, for
instance, military measures for an imminent cam
paign in any manner, I tried to prevent that
caznpaign itself but did not try to stab the G-erman
soldier in the backc" (ir, pp„ 7899).
And on the follovj-ing page of the transcript we find WBIZSAESCKSR^ s state
ments
not
"oBoI did/want to get my country defeated, Wiat I
did want was peace, and for thab purpose, eliminar^
tion of Hitler, But I did not desire bhe defeat of
Germany in order to do away with HitlBi'c " l) (Tr,
pp. 790C).
And during the defendant^ s cross—examination, we hoards
Qr. (By Dr< Kenrpner) %ere you in touch with the
Batdi, Belgian, or Trench underground movementsT
Ao (By >CE-IZSAEGKIEIR) '-Ho, that is quite a different
sabjectc My resistance woric was directed toward
internal conditions^ I did never endeavor to pro—
mo'-.o the defeat of Germany^ I would never have
done thato'^ (Tt. pp. 9234),
The claim of Canaris' widow that ItEjlZfiATCOE and her husband were *^ound
together by the same political phlloeophy and the same concern about the
anticipated disastrous course of the war"^ (WIZSABUECER Bocrument 253, Exh^
273, Vil'IZiiAlilCKEP, B., "B.> 5) is thus refuted by "WEIZSABGOIR* s own testimony
both cn direct ano. on ci*oss examination,
lahouLicu, who did nob mention ifSIZSAHGKHiR during his testimony,before
the mugt have also felt that mere coutact with Oanarls vrould not uphold
WElZi-iAEOiOlK* s resistance dalmsu In a second affidavit introdaced on be
half of V-ilZ^iAECKlIR, he therefore, adds that ^'.o.this exchange of information
was to enable both gentlemen better to brief the opposition grot^js with which
AA-QSAS.aii'tL^aa'Lt^ E-ifetur.fe cf_.th^sj|LtT3a(tlj^ii_wi,th XS^^Qt jfcq_
l) Students of the German resistance tell us that numerous other German
anti-Hazis shared Oanai-ls' view that Hitler's triumph would have been
far worse than Germany^ s total defeat^. Boring a secret choroh meet
ing in Geneva in 1941 the prominent German theologian, Dietrich Bonn—
hoeffor, statedS pray for the defeat of my nation^, Only in defeat
can we atone for the terrible crlmos we have committed against Burope
and the world"-, (Bulles, "Germany's Underground "5 page 116), Also other
true Gbrman resistance fighters realized that military defeat alone could
v.i-po out all traces of ITazisci in their oountrye,
'frt Wnt- Ti
the eliraination of Hitler which "both parties desired^^ (VJEI2SASGK]jia Doca-
ment 47, Exhibit 274. ^IZGASGKEEl B(. 5)«. However, this claim etands as
more conjecttire as TiBIZSAEJOiCER or his "^gro-up '^, according to his own testi—
mv:»ny, nover had any plans of their ovm for the elimination of Hitler and,
if he gave inlormation to the ever onrinrLs Caneris, this does not mean that
he knew at the time for what purposes this information was to he used»
Before the Lahousen also testified that Oanaris and G-eneral Oster
secretly collected docnnients incriminating .ts-, the Hazi leaders which were
to "he used after their elimination to indict them before a conrt and the
Grerman pec^le» This information is also contained in the book by Hans Bernd
(risevius 1) and confirmed by other sources. One of the defense witnesses of
WEIZHAEGKER, Tiktor Brims, in an affidavit (iVEIZa^EGESR Doconent 15, Exhibit
258, tvEISS^GKER E, B. 5) uSefi this pattern by-stating that he assembled, on
orders of Erich Kordt, in the fall of 1939, incriminating material against
Hibbentrop v/hich v;as added to the collection of such material kept by G-eneral
Oster, ViEIsaAEaiQH was stpposed to have had knowledge of the fact that such
material v/as being collectedr He might have known that Goering and A3.fred
Hosenborg also collected such material against Eibbentrcp without using this
fact later in their defense.
In rebuttal the defence yet makes an^^ther attenpt to use the mystery
srxrounding the diai'ies of Admiral Oanaris,. In WSIZSAECKER Document 503,
Ejdilbit 467, ®I38AECKER D^ B, 9, the affidavit of one Sonderegger, wo are
told a complicated story, the essence of which is that possibly WEIZSAECKEIR,
trgethor vrith Oa'iaf-'is.> may have given a warning to Yugoslavia prior to the
Germsji invs.aion rf bhac c^mtry. This vague conjecture is all the more
fantastic-in view of the defendant's own and many protestations that he would
have never committed treason or done anything "to stab the German soldier in
the back. "
The same affiant also states that he had rooess to '^A st-ody by General
s
Hans Ostor on a planned 001:5) d^otat against the Hitler government* and that
this document mentioned 1@IZSASGKER as a possible ^pointment in a post-
Hitler government^ Ho admits, however, that during his interrogations Ostor
never mentioned "KBlZSAECaCSP., It is utterly inposslble for anyone remotely
aqgu^int^d_vdth the. mont^it_y of_'t^e_Haz4;0_to bell.ev^ jth§t_V^IJS4B0K^_wnii^d
1) Hans Bernd GiBei?iuo, *To the BittfSP End-'.
Vfi
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have continued to represent Adoli' Hitler abroad if, Indeed, his
name had been discovered cm this or any other documont of such
treasonable character*
If to elaborately prove a connection betv/een the Chief of
the Military Intelligence Service and the State Secretary in the
Eoreign Office means laboring the obvious, the same must be said
of such a connection XTith the Chiefs of Staff of the Gorman Arcy»
Wo arc told time and again that close personal relations existed
between von WEIZ3ASCICER and General Beck (Affidavit by Drc Hans
Spoidel,^ ^TEIZSilKGICER Document 21^7, Exhibit 276,^ DoB» 5) and, later,
with his suoGossor, Gemal Franz Haider* V/o sl^alL deal later with
the Haider putsch plans and the defendant's connecticns with thera*
If the relationship botvreen Haider and WEIZS/JSCiCdR was intimate
and jpersonol bcj^cmd their official contact, maintained by a
specially appointed liaison man, this can be easily explained
by the great similarity of background and interests of those
tWQ' men*
ijnbassadora von Hosaoll and von dor Schulenburg, who lost
thoir Urea after the 20th July affair, arc of the sane age
group of diplomats as the defendant* Their acquaintance v/ith the
luckier oolDeaguo^ wlio> become Ribbontrop'a Stnto Secretary, is
neither unusual nor a matter of special merit for ITEIZai'iECIsER*
Haf'soll QTid \7}ilIZSti"J30ICER, initially dose friends, bocai:io
estranged later because Hacscll v/as disappointed about the
reluctance of to join the aiiti--Hazi resistonce*
HasBol.l^s. diaries, excerpts of which ore being inti'oducod aa
rebuttal ovidonoe by the Prosecuticai, oCLaarly rovool that the
rift bet\7een these tv/o men v/os not due to thb carolosaness of
Mrs, von Hosaoll, as the defendant wilL have it (aoo the affi
davit of Siegfried, Vffilza/iEGKSR Docuiiont 337* Eadxibit 257/
D*B. 5) , but bocauso ^ffilSSAEOmi did not v^t to get involved
in a conspiracy which was not in aGOordonco with his convictions?.
/lUbaasador von Hasseli felt tliat "the entire oirolo around
I . . • I ' "V* ' '
ViffiIZSk"j!lCI\ER shovja in tho long run luore and raoro tint he is
fundonontnlly woalc and impress ionabloe /jnything that tastes of
action can not bo expected from tUerea" (HosselL^s Di*«aries,
NG—575Sx Exile G-208^ ro-B> 204- A) The facts show tliat von Hassnll
"VTas correct in his observationA.
It is liker/iso neither unusual nor a matter of mitigation
that von lZEI2Si'iE0ICER waa acquainted with the Prussian Minister
of Pinance f Jolitmnes Po.pitz^ a consorvativo who was later
executed by the same regime which earlier deemed irln wortl^ of
the Golden Party Badge honoris, causa^
Among various other names which the defendant i/ishes, to call,
his "ao-aonspiratora."^ tho young Albrecht Haushofer^ a professor
of ixDlitical geography at the University of Berlin, should be
mentionedo
A personal friend of tho murdered Albrecht Haushofer^ Rainer
Hildobrandtj states in his affidavit ('rffllZSz'iECICER Document 229^
Exhibit 2li.9^ D> Ba- 5) thc.t; in Ilaushofer-s opinion, WEIZS/iEOICER
was- justified to. remain in office because ""only a person who was
near to Hitler could do something docisi-vo in order to remove him"'»
UTlIBSiiECICCR himself wont to great length to explain that ho was
any-.,hing but close to Hitlere. General Haider in his affidavit
(TTEIZa/EGKEK Bocunent iiij-S, Exhibit 270, D* B. 5) quotes 'vVEIZS/iEGiCER
as tojJdT:ig h:jn ''tha.t he only saw Hitler very seldom"«. In addition,
cl this brief will, show, "VilillZSi'dilGivER failed his murdered friend
Haushofo.r- in the expectation that he vrould do aoraothing "decisive"
to remove Hitler*"
lilldobrandt further states that liTEISS/iECKER made it possible
for Haushnfor to "dopaft quietly" for Sv/itaerland .to enter into
s^ocret negotiations* The reason for iVBXZHABOiGSH^ffi efforts aoem
hard to understand since a few lines above we i.eam that "'in the
spring of i9^h1 Albrecht Haushofor went to Switzerland with a fon-ial.
oxder issued by Rudolx'' Hess" - no one less than the Deputy 'Puehror'
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at that tine. \Jq never heard anything about the disposition mad©
of the so'-called "peace plan" which Haushofor handed to ¥BIZS^iECI^ER»
clUndoubtedly s^Areiy brilliant nan vrfio foresaw the doon which Hitler
vrould bring about at a conparably early date, Haushofer cannot be
described other than o3 a dissident Hazi» 1) Many of then turned
against their Fuehrer at one tine or another until., at the end,
Hitler felt betrayed by then allii. 2) Albrecht Haushofer was caie
of the spiritual fathers of the Nazi drocn and had, in his earlier
days,; served first on Kibbentrep^a and then on. von Papen'a personal
staff. It was at t^iat tine that ho mde the acquaintance of VfflIZ—
Beyond the fact that ^?SIza/iBOKER and Albrecht Haushofer were
on good personal teras, we leam nothing as to the nature of their
connom "anti-^iazi conspiracy". Haushofer's brother, Heins, who has.
never before made any stateiabnts as to his brother's activity
because,, as he told UoS» tntelligGnce officers in the sunanor of 1945;;
he did not Imow anything about thera, now clains in an affidavit
(\IBIZSASGICEH Docunient 4^5^ Jilxhibit 2^6, D. B. 5) that his brother-
approved of the appointment of ^TEIZSilEOICER as State Secretary. Ho
1) In his latest book "Total Povrer^* (How York, 1948) Edtiund A» Walsh,
S>Je., the Regent of the School of Foreign Service in Washington,
D.Co'^ devotes an entire chapter to Albrecht Haushofer, comparing;
him with his father, the famous geopolitlcian. Father V/alsh writes
(page 65): "Albrecht'a crimes, in strict Justice, must bo Ju<igcd to
have been more contributory to. the Hazi conspiracy than those of
his father, since the son played a far more active part in the Nazi
preparations, at least in the early stages, as we must conclude from
his captured correspondonco. But his revolt against the regime
concurred much earlier than his father's feeble opposition, since
O'
we find that Albrecht gave his su£^port to a conspiracy against
Hitler as. early as. 1940, though still luaintaining his political
csonnoctions with the regime —a paradox which c^ne of his best
friends described as. a. "'^Teird contradiction".
:) The motive of Count Holldorff, SA loader and Chief of the Bex-lin
Police, for Joining the conspiracy against Hitler was well sum
marized when he told his Nazi Judges: "We will all. have to Jump
off the Hitler bandv/agon someday". (Pullea., Q.p. Git., page 179)*'
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adda that Albrecht Haushofcr shared with V/EIZSABCICSR his secx-ot
resistance plans^ without^ however^ revealing the nature of these
X^loiis* Inasnuch as Horr Botho von Y/ussaw^ in his affidavit
(v.^EIZEAHCICniR DoGunent 59^^^ Exhibit 232^ D<v B.. 4) x also coxifioxis
that Haushofer approved of V/EIZSi'iECKEH's appointnent to high
offioo, \rG shall leave that fact unchallenged*
According to the o:Cfidavita. by Helnuth Cords (^TEISSASCivER
DocuLiont 149)6 Exhibit 250^ D» B* 5) Hans Ileinrich Boebel
(iffilZELlSIGKJill Bocuuent 143ax Exhibit 231 >1). B* 5), \YEiaSu\ECEER
figured as candidate for a position in the future Go^xian
govemnont which Albrecht Haushofer wished to see established*
Apparently Haushofer did not deen ^/ElZS/JSCICSa veiy essential in
bringing about of tliat govemuaont for he dndicatod to. Hcobcl that
ho was glad to see the State Socretaxy safely out of the country
as Hitler'a ./uibassador at the Vatioono.
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69 Active Intention to O/verthrow the Hitler Rogine
iji AnaZyais of the record before this tribunal reveals that
in fact \7EIZSABOIC3R actually can report little nore than that ho
TTaa "'in touch" with sono of the tona fide apponents of Hitler#.
His secretary and friend Toddy von Kesaolii. stated:
L*' (by Kessel) "Haushofer and Schulcnburg and
York he saw frequently and Schwerin too® More
over they nnintained contact over a period of
seven years tlnrough uy person, \7ith these later
victnis of the 2Dth July#
(by Dr» Becker) "Bid Mr# von VBIZai'iEGIdiR'a
relations Vidth the resistance novencnt confine
itself to the issuing of inforcation and the
receiving of infomation'E
A#. "In the beginning, that is to soy before 1938,
that is correct to a certain extent# Later he
becano nore active — that is to say he activated
the forces of the resistance novenent in the
service of his peace policy» i) That is be
ginning with 1938 and 1939* Still later he
considered his own activity nore and nore
under the aspect of naking contributions to
the resistance novenent> 2)"' (Tr# page 953^)
The sane witness relates the sane evidence, sonowhat nore
clearly later in his direct examination:
"Von YffilZa.iECKER waa in close contact with the
various heads of the resistance groups# Ho Was
friendly with then; ho worked with then; ho
shared the danger in which all these people
lived fron 1937 (Tr# page 9522.)
Inasnuch as tho Gestapo knew nothing of WEIZSi'iECICER'a alleged
1) This is typical of tho vague teminology in which "iJEIZS/iECiCEii
and his friends abound # Wliat "forces"? \7hat does he nean by
"activating then"? Bvory onti-tHasi v/anted peace but thoy were
all violently opposed to tho appoasonont of rlitlor# After tho
Munich ^act Goerdelor v/rote to an iuaoricon friend: "The
dovolopnent of the post v/ooks can only bo called very dangerous «
Hitler and Goering have bluffed tho entire world. But the world
had been v/amed and infoniod In tine# If these warnings had been
hooded and if one had acted accordin£^ly, Gerr.iany would be free
of her dictator today and could turn against Mussolini #••«•
By shying fron a snail risk Mr# Ohaiuberlain has nado war
inovi-ucble ###" (Dulles, Ox?* aiU, images A9, 50)#
2) Beyond the alleged exchange of infon.iation we ore never told
what those "contributions" consisted of#
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"'resistance", even after the 20th July 1944; the dan^jer of which
Herr von Kossel speaks is not too plausible (See Exliibit 3^03
(KG-557Q ; D» Co 97 G> affidavit by Huppeiilcothen,. to be further
discussed later in this brief)# All. this vatnesa soya then, is
that \vEIZSAEOIGlIR was. in contact - which os. we saw above wos
q.uite official - with the "heads of aertain resistance groups"-
and that ho was "friendly \7ith then"#. The defendant hirisolf
actually claims nothing mores
"In the suLmer of 1.938 it had bocono clear to
no if an official v/ontcd to serve pcaoo and
his fatherland he had the choice bctvToen
only two woya., that is, to {jroaoto his aius
and ideas, within the state that is to
sabotage the course steered in the directicn
of war or else to remove the heads of
government*. V/ith the neons at Liy disposal
that is politically to redirect the course
tovrcird peace, seemed to ne ny active and
direct port# Those v/ho followed the second
X.)ath, to these men I made myself available
where they nuodod no# That is, I was in
touch with G-encral Beck, G-cnoral Haider
the collaborators, of Canaris, Colonel Ost^-r,
a cerdiain Ilerr von Dohnanyi, State Secre-
taiy Planck^ Professor Albrocht Haushofer,,.
Jr.., and nary others*."
(Tr* tagea 7704 - 7705)
Ton "HEIZS/HCICEii does not oven hia;^olf claim to have followed
the path of the resistance - ha \7as "in touch";
This fact is oven norc evident if we analyse the statenonta
of the two men who testified for \ffliaSAEGKMl who were thomselvea
actively engaged in resistance activity: Pabian von Schlobrondorff
and Axel von dcm BuschOn.
The defendant's ovjn roforunco to these tiiVD men is brief and
revealing:
Q. (by Dr, Becker) "At that time did you
still maintain oontacta w.vth the resistauoe
groups at the front?.
A#, (by "Xoa, that too*. I
remember at this time there was a member
on the staff of the so-called Amy Group
Center, in the East, who called on ne*.
The Any Group was subordinated to Field
Marshal von Bockj and a Ilerr von Sclilabren-
dorff oojiio to see mo from that staff and
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he belonged to that group and he sought
sone political infomation fron ne » Then
fron a regment stationed in the Sast, a
Herr von deiTi Busche cone to aee ne» He
belonged to the sojne group*" (Tr. page
7912)
As far as Herr von Solilabrendorff is concerned, it tos
pointed out above that 'TBIZSAJilGifflR loiaw nothing -cThatsoever of
his stterapt to kill Hitler by snuggling a tino-bonb into the
dictator's plane* Schlabrendorff net V.IDIZS/'iECiCER on a purely
peiBonal errand which had no. connection with ary political
activity*
Schlabrendorff, together v/ith nany of his friends, wanted
^ to persuade the Gcn.Tan generals to novc against Hitler* Bor that
^ he needed sound political arguments* In a search for these
arguments ho reneniborod his acguaintanco with the State Secrotaiy
in the Poroign Office and wont to see hiiu to swap nilitary
lnforr.n.tion for political* Ho states:
"Both these nen (Bock and Kluge) had no
doubts about the military position of the
Third iieich* What they did doubt was the
position with respect to foreign policy
and the consQq.uencea of a coup d' etat
Orgainst Hitler fron within* Bor this reason
they wanted inforr.iation and judgments on
the political situation frcaii an official
personagOa This pcrsona.ge I saw as. Baron
von wlillSSAEOiCElR: and for this reason I
wont to see hin frequontl;^'" during the war*"
(Tr, vjagoa. 1.0536 - 10537)
And what did Herr von ^ffilZSi'iECKER tell Schlabronr.1.orff?
"I rei:iei:iber that Baion von 1/EIZ3AEGK3H in.
describing the political situation again and
again onp)has.ized that peace with Hitler was.
ir.ipossible for Gen.iany* A proreq^uisito for
peace v/as the overthrow of this nan*"
(Tr* page IQ536)
"'«** Ho went so far as to extend his thesis
'na peace with Gen.iany with Hitler',, to.
include 'no peace for Gerr.)any with Ribben—
trop)-*" (Tr> page 10557)
And in order to realize this obvious fact, which was clear ta
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every politically interested ^Derson in the v/orld, including
Hitler and Hibbentrop thaaselvoa (7^0 never TTonted to negotiate
peace) ^ WSIZS/iEOICSli had to remain in an office T?hich he claims
was distasteful to hin» "To go oven sa far"' as to infoixi an
acquaintanco in that no decent government would negotiate
with RibbontroiD can hardly bo regarded aa a resistance activiiy*
We liavo already dealt with von den Buscho'a claim that
Y/EIZSAEOlvER indoctrinated 100 Geman officers during a publia
lecture in the spirit of resistance to their Supreme Oorinander»
^vTlIZS/JilCICHIR had no connection v;ith or knowledge of von don
Busche^a plans to asaass-inate Hitler.. The v/itncsa; a family
friend ot the defendant^ moroly states that he approached
V/EIZS/iRGlCER in May of 1943> shortly before he v/ent to the
Vatican, in order to be advised as to whether i/EIZS/iBCICiStt would
prefer a milltajy dictatorship to a temporary civilian aOmini—
stro.tion mder a Reich Council.. idillZSj'JilCHBR^ hovrovor, "v/aa
sceptical of both these solutions, because the choice of p.e2>-
aonnol wou3.d moot with some difficulties with regard to their
recognition by the presur^ptive victors" ^ (Tr» page 10977) • This
T/as to moon that the Rwssiana would not care "from the knowledge
of the 3nter:ial. nature of a dictatorship" to moke any pronounoo-
nonts and the \/estem Allies "would take a long tine before
tbcy a':jl^owlc3.god the connections or recognised them".
(Tr? page 109/S)
If \ySIZSitEGmi had intended to actually take part in on
anti-^Iitler conspiracy and had he not been "'sceptical" of the
solutions, it offered, fee could have used his stay in Ron as
Ajabassador to the Vatican ta good advantage to infora:i the
/aiies of the intentions and character of the personnel which
the resistance hod choson» He did not make any such attempt nor
v/aa he ever approached by the anti-fl!itler conspirators, them
selves to make it.. Atter.ipts. to seoret.ly infoaxi the United States
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aoverment of ttie persons who took port in the later conspiracy,
of which IffilZa'JilGiuiK loiew nothing, were successfully made by Hans
Semd Gisevius and others , but not by any of "iTSIza/iSCKER^s friends*
The ^contributions to the resistance noveLient" of v/hich
Horr von Kessel speaks (supra) and v^ich the defendant himself calls
"total ros-'.istance" are interpreted by the witness, von Etsdorf,
who also furnished an affidavit (V/SIZa^iEGICEH Docunent
Exhibit Dc D. 5)-^ as followst
"Von VfflIZSAEClCSR*^a conspiratorial part could only
consist therefore, in his making felt his spiritual
authorily by again and again furnishing new argu^-
ments to the military which would urge then to take
the plunge, to start acting. For the rest, he could
only remain at readiness in order to stap^ into the
gnp, if the government should be overthrown
(irc page 3.6iQ)
It still ranains doubtful whether '.ffilZS/iECKER, who made nc
leading
oiiorts to spealc to any/general other than Haider since the out
break of the war, was conscious that the information Trfiich he
exchanged was used to convince the goneraOa "to take the plunge"*
At best, then, \7EISSASCKER* s arguments and "spiritual authority'"
were used, did not use thejn* He passively romained in touch
with some persons, who might some day replace the Hitler govern
ment so that ho would not bo left out, so that he also "might
step into the gai^". This v/ould be a far cry from any intention
on the part of ITEIZaWiaiK to overthrow the rogimo*
For hop^ could ho hope to accomplish a change of regime if
"ho did not favor Civil. V/or in Gorr.iaiy" as Erich Kordt admitted
(Tr. p* 7517 - IS).
This actual absence of any real intention to act ©gainst
Hitler is admitted clearly by the defendant hii.iself;
"I waa of this opinion from the summer of 1938 on.,
that WQ could not in the long run preserve peace
with Hitler^ That is w^y I considered resistance
1) aoo Allen Dulles, Op* cit*, pages 133 i'i'#
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neoesaaiy^ The main people in the novoments
Imev/ that, they were in touch virith ne# I
advised then, but I, nysalf, 01.1 not the nan
to carry out violent actions of such a nature*"
(Tr» page 7708)
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V/31I3SA!5CI{SR did not state - or at loast not convincin.'^ly or
imi^licitly — that he v/as opposed to Hitler or Hazlsn per se or quite
simply "because, as a resistance pamphlet distributed in Gennany early in
1943 stated it, ",o.today every decent German is ashamed of his govem-
mout," Nor did he feel he would put himself in his anhiguous position
so as to ''reven.-^e and to atone'' as is stated in a resistance manifesto
of 18 I'e'bruary 1943.^) VJEI3SA3CICER considers it "resistance" the.t he
came to the o"bvious realisation that peace would not "be preserved with
Hit?-er at the helm. He himself gives the answer as to why he v^ishod
to delay vfBv,
"It was the prevention of war, which, according to
ny opinion at that time, woyld ha.ve„Qenafc__.the^Giid_.
p^f^Geraany;^" (Tr, page 7695)
IVRIZSAEOlCESs one of the few men in the higher Hazi hierarchy who
have lived abroad, therefore know the potentialities of .Germany's
enonies and realized that in the long run a war w^uld mean defeat and
destruction. One is forced to conclude, that if he opposed war at all,
he opposed*it not becouse of its evilsbut because he did not consider
it timely, ^It is history that he shared this view ^'rith many a German
General Staff officer and high civil servant (and for a time with Gee-
ring himself) v/ho later nevertheless contributed their best to Hitler's
early victories,
WSIZSAEOyEIl'S actual alleged efforts to preserve the peace
boil down to a variety of schemes, most contradictory in their nature,
which never really in-volve him directly but of which he is claimed to .
have been the spiritual father,
IThe first of these schemes involves the complex diplomacy which
load up to the Munich Agreement of September SO, 1938.
1) Pamphlets issued by the anti-ITo.zi students who revolted in Munich
in February 1943 - see Eothfols. "The German Opposition to Hitler",
TOpage 12.
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T'TEIZSAECKSR tells us that in line with his ovm 'lesires at that i
tine he wanted an agreenent which v/oiild, hy giving Gernany wna.t she
wanted in the Sudetenland neke war unnecessaryB He claims to have
drafted the conditions which wore then ;oresented "by the Italians and
accented hy the I'rench and British governments. And even today in spite
of the fact that the world has realized that appeasement at that tine
actually precipitated the wor, VrSIZSASGTCEH stoutly defends what he
claims was his "brain child. (The role v/hich V/EIZSAEC3KEH played in this
significeJit historical episode is dealt with in detail in the Prose
cution Brief on Count I.)
However, at the same tine VJSIZSASC'CBP. alleges to have instigated
an action of private and clandestine diplonr.cy, carried out naitly "by
the "brothers. Brich and Theodor Kordt, which culminated in a warning
given the British government nojfc to enter the agreement with Germany,
which was su"bsequently sealed at Munich. Had the British government re
sisted the demands for the Sudetenland, the brothers Kordt tell us,
and had Hitler ••irdered war as a result, the secret German opposition
D )
would ha-5'e removed the German war lord."'''
Me are, tlnis, to believe that tiTSIZSAEClCER pursued two policies,
diametrically opnosed, at the same time.
Erich Xnrdt testified at great length that WEIZSAECKER, for rea
sons of his own, desired to counteract the theory that Hitler and
Ribbentrop vrerc only bluffing when they threatened to take the Sudeten
territory by f -rce if they c uld not have it otherwise. It was in order
to counteract the "bluff-theory" that "vvHIZSABCICSR allegedly origina.ted
D'
2)
Tlie defendant made it repeatedly clear that he favors having the
Sudeten Germans included in the Roich.
Both brothers hordt have often told their story before but, strangely
enough, they hfive never bef-'-re nontinned VfBIZSABGKEK in connection
vrlth it. Erich Kordt did not even see cause to nentkon WEIZSAECICER
in onnection with the warnings to the British when he stood before
his Denazification Tribunal, ?Tor is mention made of the defendant
in this case in his book "vrahn und Wlrklichkeit". Defense E:<.458
(^.'TEIZSAJldCER Doc. 500, Doc.Bk. 9) refers to information given by
Dr. Erich Kordt to the U.S, Department of State, This information
did not contain any reference to l^IZSAEOICER's alleged resistance.
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the idea of i-rarnin^ the British g'^vernncnt, Erich Kordt stated:
"VJell, ^.fter consultation th"t vre (?) hod with the
amy circles one niominf^ WSIZSAECTCSH asked me vrhother
or not a direct approach could be made to the British
Giwerrjiente. It would, of coursSj be hazardous to put
that thr'^ugh to the British embassy in Berlin^ it should
be done dircctlyo After some reflection I su.'gested that
\-jQ should approach Sir Horace Wilson and lord Halifax,
both personalities whom vre knev; to be of hi^jh moral
responsibility..." (ir* 7380)
The vrarninr"! was to be given by 'I'heodor Kordt, Xfho 'h^as to divulge
Imovrledgo tha.t he \iras not speaking for Hitler's government but for the
Gennnii opposition, and that we urged the British Government to make
an unnistalcable declaration that they meant business". (Tr*, page 7380)
Thcodor Kordt testified that he did issue such a warning to Lord
Halifax on 7 Sontenber 1938 and that he added:
"If a statement, as required should be issued, the
Army leaders are prenared to a,ct a.go.inst Hitler's
nolicy".
Theodor Kordt also insists that ^^SIZSABKiOBR originated the idea
of such a warning and implies that he v/as in agreement with the plan that
the v/hole affair was to lead up to a military putsch under the> direction
of Haider-,
But Haider^ in his affidavit, (VTSIZSABCICSH Boc. 145, Ex.270 Doc.3k.
5) states: "Wich von Witzleben's Imowledgo I used this occasion to in
form von WEIZSAECKER in general terms of the military plot which had
been plam-ied by von Witzlebon and myself and v/hich as is well knovm, was
only mrevcnted by Chamberlain's and Da.ladier's visit to Munich", If von
VEISSASCSuEH originated the idea, v;hy did Haider have to inform him about
it?
On the contrary,. VJEI^SAEOjCER.. far from strengthening Raider's a.nd
the other general's determination, added to their hesitation and va
cillations by ranlying t., Haider's qaestion ns to Hitler's intentions
"I dnubt that he himself knows as yet", (Haider affidavit, V/EIZSAECICER
B.ic«145, Sx. 370 Hoc.3k, 5)
According to Erich Kordt, the nutsch plan was little more than
hypothetical. It was deduced by Kordt, and v/hoover else may have been
involved in this affair, th'^t there might have been a putsch, it was
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hoped thnt there ifould he one;
"V/hat w-uld he the situation for Hitler? (if the
British had heeded the v;arnin^ of Then ICordt and
nade a strong stand,) Ji'ither he had to retreat —
that was an attitude v/hich, hardly, dictators
have survived for a long tiie ~ or he would go
on with his plans. Then we crmld hope for his
overthrow, with the assistance of a part of the
army,,," (Tr, page 7381)
And, according to Erich Eordt, mzS--.BCI2S hiitself was douhtful
tha.t such a putsch was actually to tahe place. He was most reluctant
to see Germany plunged into civil war. Asked in cross-exnnination
vrhether V/EIZSAHCICER v/ould have done everything -jossihle to aid the
putsch, Kordt replied;
"He preferred peace to war. And therefore he vreis
certainly not against the putsch^ Perhaps he
doubted a little "bit whether in the end, the gen
erals would follow us.
Ci. "In other words when you nade your efforts to
have the British follov;- your advise, VffllZSAECICEH
himself doubted whether the generals would act,
and yet you expected the British ennire to follow
this advice?
A. "Exactly,"
And in contrast to Kordt's hopes at the time that Hitler would
not be able to survive the loss of prestige inherenb in a retreat
duo to a pu:blic_^British announcement of determined opposition to
I' Hitler's aims (both ICordt brothers stressed repeatedly tha.t the British
statement should be uublic to impress the German peo-ole), V.CEIZSAECKEH
tells his son;
"My father said at the tine: 'Ifhat I would have to try,
and v;ha.t X try is to get the British and the Erench
to tell him (Hitler) clearly but not publicly, that
they would enter the w^r - not publicly, so that he can
get out of it without any loss of -orostige because, '
he said, ' no one is so demendent on -arestige as a
dictator'". (Tr. page lOOSO)
I^hile the Defense v^as unable to supmort the Eordt story with any
evidence other than the testimony of those themselves Involved, the
Prosecution has introduced a document, si.pied by I'/EIZSiBCICER, which
substantiates the close cooperation between the defendant and the Kordt
brothers,(This 'oersonal letter, addressed to Theo Kordt in London, is
marked for the personal attention of Dr, Erich Kordt prior to dispatch).
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Hov/ever^ the ai m of that cooperation is far different from that v/hich
thej now proclaii^. Far from working against Hitlers aggressive design
on CzechoslovaL^ia VJEIZSiECiuSa malces British non-interference the sing
qua non for further German-British relations;
''Your arguments as to what the English would have to do
in respect to Czechoslovakia is in complete accord
v;ith what I would say in the same position. As to more
general German-English discussions, you too can of
course not take a completely negative attitude in London
and dash the hopes of these Englisiimen •'.;ho entertain
hopes for such discussions. I ^hquld^
Uie point, that without settlement__in the_ bLirnjuig Czpch „ _
proble:^_there_co-:M__b£ no question qf__disc_u_ssions ^looking _
further aJiead._Kiuidest regards and Ke_il _hntleri_yours
"(signed)" hEIZSAECia:R (NA25S3, Ex. 80 Doc.Bk. 3 A)
Thus Lord Vansittarpf^ s statement that he did not gain the impression
that the Kordt's "really intended to take action against the regime or
that they were associated \^th any persons or groups who would do so"
(NG-57S6, Ex. C-65 Doc.Bk. 204) merely confirms v/hat is already con
tained in the record.
The Defense has gone to great pains in its rebuttal evidence
to challenge the credibility of ohe former British Undersecretary of
State (see lidiibits 332, 46O, 46I, 462, and 463 contained in t/EI2S.\ECI2SR
Document Book 9 as hJEIZSAEGICER Documents 40?^ 513^ 51A-, 515 and 516)-
Tliis is surprising in view of the fact that the Defense initially re
lied heavily on Lord Vansittart as a vri-tness to one of its major con
tentions and first mentioned him in this case.
In direct examination the Defense "witness Erich Kordt stated in
connection with the a3-lsged warning given to the British government
prior to the ilunich Agreement;
'HTe got in touch vdth the then First Diplomatic Ad.visor
to His I'lajesty's Government, Sir Robert Vansittart "
(Tr. page 7395)
During cross-examination the Prosecution inquired of tnis Witness
just how close his relationship with Lord Vansittart was. Erich Kordt
replied that he saw Vansittart personally on "fice or six occasions"
(Tr. page 755B).
Q, Had you reason, through your interiaediaries viio arranged
this contact, to assui'Ae that VarisittaifeA vjould regard
you as a competent man of the German opposition to discuss
these important policies?
A. Othervdse I would not have approached him. (Tr.p.7559)
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Theo Kordt, testifying "before the Coninission, went into even
greater detail regarding his relationship with Lord Vansittard:
"I have knovjn Sir Vansittarf, (today Lord Vansittari.) since
i932e Our relationship, "beginning i/ith the surimer of 1938,
until June 1940, has endured all of this time. Since August
1938 vje had; at regular intervals, confidential meetings
I'Thich, on the one hand^ took -^lace with the approval of
Lord Ealifax and .on the other hand with the approva.l of
State Secretary von'Tifeizsaecker, Mutual information of a
•purely dinlonatic nature, aimed toward ma.intaining the
;peace were exchanged in these meetings which usually took
place in the aT^tnent of Mr, Conwall Svans, 31 Cornwall
Gardens, and a'lso sometimes in Lord "Vansittart ' s apart
ment in Park Lane; or in my o\m apa.rtment at 7 Cadogan
Place,,
The idea of these meetings was to see to it that
diulonatic apparatus of "both parties would cooperate
towards maintaining ueace. The advice that was given
from "bcbh sides at these marticular meebings were only
aimed at one thing: the thwarting of Hitler's infernal
plans, end to prevent Hitler from using the success of
the moment to bring about a world catastrophe at the
same time,'' (Tr, page 2020/21)
ITow, that in his affidavits Lord "Vansittart has stated the
actual facts of the story, the hero has suddenly bocone the villain
and is attacked for his political views on Gemanye Yet, it must be
borne in mind that it was the Defense who stressed that Vr-nsittard
v/as their key contact with the British Government, Thus only Vansittart
was in a position to sustain their contention or establish its grossly
e:oaggerated quality. A belated attack u-oon his person can in no v/ise
alter the credibility of his testimony concerning cooperation with the
self-styled conspirators.
It also does not seen to serve any particular puri:)Ose in this
trial to attempt to rehabilitate the doubtful reputation of the Yordt
brothers. Again the Defense is cleverly side—tracking the main issue,
iFor the issue here before the Courb is not whether two men named
Kordt were or were nob Nazis but ^merely vrhether, v;hen they conversed
with members of the British government, they did so cin_instruct.ion^
The numerous rebuttal evidence produced by Defense
does neither prove nor even mention this. Lord Halifax in liEIZSAH;CliEE
Document 496 453, -^Doc.Bk«10) merely confirms some correspondence
"oertaining to the Denazification trial of Erich Lordt. It does not con—
tcain the slightest hint that ^VEISSAECIOIE, who claims to have been the
originator of the J^onich Agreement. •, C'/'""
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had anything to do with the con
versations which Kordt may^or may not have held with British officials
at that time.
The BishoT? of Chichester states (l^ElZSASCKER Docunent 497-, Ex,454,
BoCsBk. 10) "that Information came to ns in the United Kingdom that the
State Secretary von V/BIZSABCICSil was opprs ed to Hitler and Rihhentrop
and the '^rzi. policies and was using his official "oosition to avoid
wa-r," The Bishop's further statements do in no way suhstantiate this
claim. ITor are v^e told how and in which way the defendant VffilZSABCXZE.
opposed the regime he sei'ved . "•'hen in the summer of 1942 the Bishop
personally received information on the existence of the German re
sistance movement "by P' stor Dietrich Bonhoeffer he mentioned the
names of Goordeler and Beck and "nemhers of the opposition in the
Eoreign Office,." The Bishop, like other-students of the German re
sistance, Imow v;ell who these opposition members in the Foreign Office
were: Adam von Tro^ufc zu Solz, Hans Berndt von Haeften, and Count Uer-
ner von der Schulonhurg, Heithor in this affidavit nor in his earlier
account of Bonhoeffer's • '^•isit uuhlished In September 1945 in "Con-
tommorary Review" is the name of V/HII2SA.ZC-Zi]R mentioned nor any
allusion made to the State Secretary, '^fhen the above mentioned
cp'oosition members in the Foreign Office were tried and executed by
Hitler, '!'/EIZS---ECICERj v;ho at thai; time was safely at the Vatican, did
not move a finger to helm them,
Dr, R-obert ^u-erst Ulrich ('••/SIZS.-_CICSR Document 498, Fx, 455, .
DoCeBk, lO) farther enhajices the Kordt story, allegedly backed and
monthly apmoaring in England, Also nuotcd in Dulles, op.cit.
p.117 and Rothfels, op,ci-fc,pa40 pp. Curiously the British Magazine
"Conterpoorary Rovievr" is mentioned else'^ rhere in this trial. The "Ta-
resparola" '^ f the defendant Dietrich of 14 March 19-04: reads:
"The lapidary statement made by "Contenroorary Review",
"the.t England used its former world mower in order to
plunge the world into two gigantic wars" is to be used
in connection with the further exi^ilanations of this
newspaper on Poland in the most effective way and to
bo highlighted e.s a sensational confession."(HG-3411 Exh, 1278 Doc.Bk. 13 A)
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sponsored "by V/EIZSASCKHR, on the "basis of "certain very confidential
renarks" made to him by Theo Kordto Ulrich left the German I'orei^
Office in 1935> His statements are contra-dicted by another defense
affiant; Selzan (vrSIZSAECICEF. Document 493, Sxh, 450, Doc»3k„ 9) who^s
statement "I went, to see you (the UeSo ambassador) u^uihoriz^d_b2 ihS
^er:.ianJH'^rei^_Office" was confirmed by Mr. Joseph P. Kennedy in July
1946p^)3ut at that time VSISSA^CICLR was not yet on trial and no efforts
to connebt him with "resista.nce'' activities were then thou^t expedient'?*.
The affidavit by Prau Goerdeler, the widow of the esiecuted resistance
leader (irSIZSAIJGKER Document 503, Ssh^ 456, DoCcBk. 9) contradicts some
of the statements made by other defense affiants to the effect that
VJEIZSA.'^ tClCSR' g resisbancG activity was allegedly well known to important
persons abroad^ Prau Goerdeler, however, maintains. that her husband
never divulged the names of his German collaborators. She does not say
whether a- ••.l" i-• 1'fflIZSASCKSR, v/ho before the wa.r gave "confidential
information" to her husband, is to be induded among Goerdoler's colla
borators. To students of the German resitano© this would be news indeed,
Pollovring this strange and inconsistent side-^ne of super secret
diplomacy — on which history surely has not spoken the last word -
synagogu-es burned in Germany and Geriimns tortured and killed their
Jewish compatriots on the street, while the ''resistance movement'•* re
mained silent„ Instead, V/3IZS&3GICER vrent to Paris and made even this
outrage "respectable" by eulogizing the man whose death precipitated
the greatest anti-Semitic progron ever seen in a once civilized country.
Then Hitler mn,rched into Prague and the "resistance movement" remained
silent again, iTo attempt was made before this court to explain this
silence.
The same Edua.rd von Selzam during cross examine.tion admitted that
V/DI3SAEG:.ER was not informed his secret communications with I-!r.
Kennedy and Lord Yansittart, He believed that rossibly Theo ICordt
might ha.ve told the State Secretary, (Tr, p, 32465)
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The silence of the "Resistance" before and after
Prague is even more surprising, since it was clear to ^
everyone that this was the decisive point in the policy
of the Third Reich* It vjas at this point that th^ pre
text of uniting all Germans in one big Reich was now
dropped without scruple and the German govcrnmen"'; changed
over openly to a policy of conquest* It vras obvious that
this flagrant violation of previous agreements V70U'-d never
be tolerated by the Western Powers* Thoroforo any .resistance
group could count certainly xvith the approval of, or at
least with some political baching from the V/estern Po\^ers*
nonetheless, the " Resistance ** did not move, and it T.^as
HEIZSASCKER who played a leading role in the diplcsnatic
preparation and in the diplomatic support of this new anc;
decisive aggressive act of the I^'iird Roich*
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Ho sooner was the svrastica raised over the nnhap-ny city of Pragae
as the ITrzis turned their attention on Poland, The role which the de
fendant "played in the diplomatic double game which precipitated this
second and most horrible ''forld War is described in the Prosecution
Brief against T.^BIZSABlCICEHi S dealing lyith Count I, Be it just mentioned
here tha.t it seems a matter of incomprehensible inconsistency that the
very sane people, including the defenda.nt, v;ho allegedly urged the
British government to be strong and sh-w themselves unyielding towards
Hitler's Germe.ny during the Sudeten crisis, admit to hrve strongly ob
jected to the guarantees which this sane British government gave to a
threatened and endangered Poland. (Tr, page 12031), That also was
"resistance" — but resistance to the only measure which could still
hope to deter Hitler's Germany from expanding still further.
As the Gorman armies swept across Poland, the German resistance
and the men of peace again remained silent. VffilZSAECICHR, in his direct
examina.tion, even makes an attempt to Gxrolain this failure of the
"resistance" to act during those last days of ueace the v/orld has seen
in 10 years. -A-nd it is this explanation which, the Prosecution holds,
is the clue to VTSIZSAECKEH's enigmatic soul; he did not want Civil Ivar,
u"heaval, or a disturbance of the given order. He worshipped the State
oven long before it became totalitarian and outri^t criminal, he served
it to the bitter end and what he calls his "resistance" now was in fact,
at best, occasiona.l scruples. The very word "resistance" by definition
moans action,
q. (by Dr. Becker) "But this still leaves the question
omen as to why the resistance movement in Germany In
the summer of 1939 failed to opuoso Hitler.
A* (by WSIZSAECKia) "I think this question can really
be ansvrercd in a very simple manner. Take the man
in the street. He didn't recognize this frivolous
gamo that Hitler was carrying on. To o-pose Hitler
/in would mean Civil bar and/this Civil War this man
would not even have knmm what the outcome would be
and whether nations abroad would take part or not,"
(Tr. page 7864)
"o,.(one) would not even have Imtown what the outcome would be and
whether nations abroad would tp_ke part or not." In other words, the
German opposition Cvould not act, once war had broken out, because they
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could not "be sure whether internal upheavals thus created v/ould not he
Used to good advantage hy Gernany^s enenies.
The defendant indicates that he desired a coup d'etat prior to the
invasion of the T?"estern countries, that he was "even consulted" about
it;
A. (hy VraiZSASCICER) "In October 1939, General
Haider, the Chief of the General Staff of
the Gerraan Ariay once again organized a drive
against Hitler in the event that Hitler was
going to undertake the tTestern canpaign this
winter* I was even consulted and asked ny
opinion. And I ha-d advised that this drive
go into effect because H'~lder, like many
other peonle, wanted to use the winter 1939 -
40 free of any vrarfare in order to negotiate
for Toeace,
0. (Judge Haguire) "3y whom were you consulted
or with v/hom did you consult?
A, (by V/SIZSAHCIOIH) "My mediator in this quotion
between General Haider and myself was Hcrr von
Htzdorf, I think he has previously been mentioned
here too. He was my liaison nan with the staff
of General Header, ...also with Erich Kordt,"
(Tr. page 7865)
This liaison between the Chief and Staff and the defendant is con
firmed by Hasso von Etzdorf who stated, speaking of the putsch plans
of this time:
Q. "Did you notify Herr von "WEIZSASCKEH concerning
all this?
A, "Yesj throu^out these weeks and months I saw
Herr von "IfElZSAECICEJR almost every other day
and I infomed him of ell details of the plans
which were being deliberated on then. In most
instances he used to receive me with the words:
''"^ell, have we finelly reo-ched the stage at
last'? or '^men are the Generals going to start
the fi.iiht?' But finally when vre had to recog
nize tha,t the nagnanimous initiation for a coup
d'etat had been missed and rendered futile,
then he wa.a doswerate because he came to see
and recognize that nothing would now be able
to prevent Hitler from breaking out in the
Vest and therefore the fatal disa.st6r vjas in
evitable and forced to take its course and it
was along these linos that he often expressed
his opinion to me at the time
(Tr. page 9601)
l) These remarks clearly indicate the passive attitude of the defen
dant. Even according to the doubtful evidence given by his friends
he merely waited for things to happen. There is no indication that
ho urged action as Goerdeler or von Hassell did dontinuously.
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Eilder, in his affidavit (VJSI'^ SAEGIffiR Docunent 145, Bxh* 270, Doc.
3k. 5) also assorts that !'/EIZSASCI{ER vas informed of the •Dutsch-plans
at the'time, which in a c-areful reading of this affidavit, however, are
revealed as vagae and nnderterminod.
Just to v/hat extent this entire putsch plan of Eovenher 1939 v;as
seriously considered "by the defendant is amply illustrated "by the re
ference made to this period in the testimony of his son:
"He said at the tine that the All5-es would h'^ve to
put on the brake from outside and from inside the
Generals would have to do it, and he kept in con
tact with both; but a lot of other strange methods
were considered. I remember tho.t my fo.ther occa
sionally used to ask ne:- 'Ca.n't one get the as
trologers to explain to Hitler that he is running
into his misfortune?' ..." (Tr, pages 10022-10023)
In.,V/EI;ZSAECICE?J s'cstinatinn+thc coum d'etat did not cone off be
cause one could not be sure whether the British would actually stay
put and not interfere, Thr.t, as v/e sh-all see, was also the explanation
given by the generals.
But, according to the witness Thco Hordt, such assurances were, in
fact, given. This witness gave evidence thot Novillo Chamberlain himself
in a handwritten letter assured "uhe German opposition that his government
would favor a chr.nge of regime in Germany and would not interfere in a
military sense should a revolution occur. (V/SIZ3A3CICSR Document 470,
Bxh. 333)
Theodor Kordt himself interprets the meaning of this letter as
follows:
"From this statement and from the explanation which
Mr. Cornwell Hv^^ns gave to me it became quite evident
th-^t the British government was prepared to negotiate
V7ith any trustvrorthy German government which would
replace Hitler's government on p respectable basis
and without ^.ny intentions of reprisals." (Tr.page 12068)
"''.rhat information did you give to Comwell Hvans?
A. "By virtue of the instructions which I received
in Berlin from Mr. V/BIZSAHCICSR and by virtue of
the infomation which I received from the military
forces I informed Comwell Evans of the fact that
the friends of peace in Germany Intended soon and
probably still in November, to carry on a plot
ajgainst the Hitler government. The British government
had already probably expected such a report because
the statement of Hoville Chamberlain which I have
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Just quotod seened to have the purpose of assuring
the military leaders ahout the fact that the disorder
v;hich Vfould necessarily result if a coup d'etat was
successful would not he utilized for a sudden attaxk
on the ^festem front. It nrust he renemhered that at
that time ,the Gernio-n Amy and the France—British army
were facing each other without any action taking
place.
"Did you have an opportunity to pass on this statement?
"Through a secret courier. Immediately afterwards
I sent this riessa,ge to my hrother..(fr. page 1S069)
So here then, was a definite answer and assurance 'Vhether nations
abroad would take part or not" (Tr^ page 7864)o •A.nd this official
assurance was passed on to Erich Kordt and to VJEI23AECICEH,
Thcodor Kordt, who repeatedly stated that in these natters ho acted
on instructions from TVEI2SAECKBR, asserted that he assured lord Van-
sittard:
"In agreement with my brother, I have done everything
humanly possible in order to inform our friends of the
absolute reliability of the word which has been given
to us-" (Tr, page 18074)
Yetr the actual consoirators never knew about this assurancOe In
fact it is generally claimed tha-o one of the reasons why no action was
taken at the time was that an internal uprising in tines of war would
invite attack from abroad. In all the leng*l;hy testimony given in other
trials by General Haider about the plans for a putsch in November 1939,
the Chamberlain letter is neither mentioned nor hinted at. Hassoll, vrho,
according to his diaries, vras in constant touch with the oppositional
military who considered a putsch, knew nothing of the British communi
cation. 1) 27one of i/3IZ3AECIC3R's other witnesses mention it.
1) Allen Welsh Dulles writes on page 54 of his book (Op.cit,):
'n'^ eanwhile Bassoll, through his connections in the Tatlcan,
tried - without much success - to find out v;hether the Allies would
refrain from attacking Germany in the event that the removal
of Hitler and the mzi party led to internal
such assurance was necessary to meet the objection of the mili
tary leaders that a successful plot meant revolution an. that
revolution would open the door to enemy occupation.
Hasscll writes in his diaries on 5 December 1939 that Goerdeler
was told by Haider why the contemplated coup of November 1939
was not carried out. One of the reasons given were; "One Ccamot
rebel if one has one's nose on the enemy"® Ulrlch von Hassell,
"Fom anderen Deutschland", Atlantis Terlag, Zuerich, (Page 106).
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The only conclTision which can he drawn fron these facts is that
W3IZ5AJ1CKER and his friends did not i>ass on the vital infomation of the
British assurance to the actual conspirators. It nust he assumed, therei--.
fore, that the "resistance nan" "WjUZSAJSCSEER sabotaged the efforts of the
true resistance.
Such suspicion seems justified in view of WEIZSABCKER's hlunt re
jection of the peace efforts on the part of the Pope which, as we know
today, were partly inspired hy the German resistance-,
WBIZSAJSC5KER, in a memorandum dated 3 July 1940 and hearing his sig
nature, noted his own reaction as follows: (Esh. C-339, K'G—5610):
"l^hen the Buntio then inquired carefully ahout the German
answer to the Papal mission, I disregarded that part of
the topic and remarked that we are only concerned with
the fullest possible preparations for the war against
England,"
And if Haider indeed entertained any ideas of removing Hitler with
the object of negotiating peace, VIEIZSAECKES did his best to dissuade
him from this plan.
On 14 October 1941 the defendant sent a speech which he made a week
earlier to the Chief of the General Staff through their special "secret
liaison nan", von Etzdorf, In his covering letter to Etzdorf, WEIZSAECEEE
calls the special attention of Haider to the last paragraph of his
lecture. This paragraph reads:.
Among the numerous British documents captured
by us, there is a British memorandum which is very
enlightening. It is dated Winter 1939/40 and deals with the
question of x^ar aims. This memoiandum contains a passage
to the effect that the removal of Hitler alone would not
be sufficient and thr.t if the Germans were to leam of any
plan for a political -jartition of Germany or for the de
struction of Genpan unity, they would rally behind Hitler.
Thus one would have to wait, ly^n^ti)day_li is_sajfe
asjuae_thaj^ a vistiirioTiSjBxitaih_w(2Uid_.t£e^t_u^ 5£iihout_
a®rex lf^she_were in_a_pasitioni t.o_dp. sPjt. If we weaken
and release our stranglehold on her too early, then we
are lost. Then the slogan would no longer be: t.he. 40=.-.
JLtjcuctiop. ^f__Hitiex-^imgnx Jiui. t,h§. jie^txu^tloa Qf_G§r^]^_
hers^l^,__ But the prerequisite for negotiations with
BritP-in at any time is that our military power must re
main intact." (HG-2719, Exh, 3610, Doc.Bk, 97 C)
In so me.ny words, IVEIZSaSCOR made a effort to tell Haider -
two years before the Casablanca formula that in his opinion Britain
_ V — — —
See Eothfels, op.olt. 133.
-kB-
would. trSrit Germany X'fithout Hitler no different from a Germany v/ith
Hitler, Which is tantamount to telling the General: "there is no use to
remove Hitler hut instead we must keen our military power intact". Gran
ted, for a monenti that 1'/EIZSA.3CICSR was in no position to speak his mind
in a public lecture. But certainly no one could force him to publicly
state a.n opinion which is diametrically opposed to the opinion he nov;
v/ishes us to believe he held at the time. He never had to bring up this
subject. And, at any rate, ho did not have to especially call this
opinion to the attention of the very man whom he now clains to have
attempted to persuade of the very opposite vievr.
This admonition to the Chief of Staff if the Hazl armies is also
in strange contradiction to the defendants statement before this Court:
"...All men v/ho worked in favor of peace in Germany,
however, had to wait for his first major defeat, his
first major set-back; and wc knew that it would only
be possible to overthrow Hitler after such a major set
back ha.d actually taken place, because in the eyes
of the German people, from 1933 to 1941, Hitler had
progressed from one manifest achievement to another and
the masses did rot know the symptoms of crisis tha.t
showed up," (Tr. pages 791P - 7913)
However, the sentintent expressed in the above cited lecture, which
was called to Ealder's special attention tends to confirm a suspicion
which ambassador von ^ssell seemed to have had of liTSIZSA-SCIiBR's real
motives in breaking off their mutual rel'-tionship. In May 1945 Eassell
noted in his diary:
"At the bottom of it all there probably lay the fact the.t
the V/HIZSAECKHH grom had taken at face value certain so-
called English peace feelers that were really of no consequence
and was nov/ worried lest the vievr that England would not
make peace with Hitler should disrunt their efforts...
(l'TG-5759, Exh. 588, Doc, Bk, 504 A)
HG-3719, Exh, 3610, Doc.Bk. 97 C alone proves tha.t WSIZSAECICSE is
grossly distorting the facts if he claims now that ho preached the
go^el: "Ho Peace With Hitler". It means, at least, that he did not v/ant
to remove Hitler if this was to mean the military defeat of the .fatherland.
In addition, it shows the true nature of the relationship between Hai
der and TVEIZSAECICEE =ind their "secret liaison man", Etzdorf.
In A-oril 1940 V/EIZSAECICER allegedly held a conversation another
general, General Hermann Geyer, according to the affidavit by one
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Dr. Hans ^eidel (VJEIZSA33CKEE Document S47, Esii, 376, Doc. Bk, 5).
The affiant asserts thp.t TffilZSASCKSE agreed with the General that the
national Socialist regime should he eliminated and to have inquired
ahout the attitude of military leaders at that time. But the dofen-
drnt himself clearly indicates that such talk, if it actually took
place in this form, was merely prompted hy the fenr of military blun
ders. Delating alleged deliberations about a change of government
after the German defeat at Stalingrad, lOIZS^CiCSR stated:
"Yes, there were serious deliberations about that, and
I must add to this that Minister Popitz, the Prussian
Pinance Minister —who, by the way, also became a vic
tim of the later plot on Hitler's life —told me at that
time that there were two German Yield Marshals who had
great misgivings, pursuant to^the Casablanca formula,
as to what would happen to a Germany that was freed of
Hitler, Popitz told me that tliese Yield Marshals desired
that I give then a statement and comment on this question
in writing. As a matter of course, I refused to give any
such written statement. 1) It i-rasn't possible to put that
do\ra in "i^iting at all. However, I stated the.t the queations
put by these Yield Marshals were wrong in nature, there
vras no alternative In existence. With Hitler there was no
hope for peace wha.tsoever. Therefore, we would have to run
the risk and we v;ould have to try it, because o.then>ris^ we_
jtfould be_in a ^tat^ o.f_such utt.er ^zhrausiip.n_th'.t. nobody_
at_all__would_b^ vfilling to t.alk_with us anyin_ore._Therefore_my
t.liesis_was_in favor o.f_a_change iif_regimG.,_but_tj2 r.enal.n_
forc^ful_and_sirp.n^,_bo.th noxally and iihy.si.cally^ ^o_that.
we wo'-'ld still be accepted as a worfH"y •oar^ner_fo.r_,li^—
i^ot.ia.ti.ons_b^fp.r^ the All.i^s„vri.th.in pux oj'^ D. c.ouA£.r^» 5)
I said that the revolution had to come in such good time
that it would not be degraded into a form of capitulation.
(Tr, page 7917)
l) In contrast to this extreme caution on the part of IVEIZSAECHER, It
is interesting to note the reaction of a genuine member of the
German resistance, Dr, Carl Yriedirch Goerdeler, Allen Welsh
ijLlles, in his book "Germany's Underground", relates the following
(page 33);
"l^hen a general whom Goerdeler iiras trying to win over
resisted on the ground that it vras easy for oerdeler
to incite others to actions for which he would not
have to pay, Goerdeler is reported to have immediately
written out in longhn.nd and signed an indictment of
the Nazis and an appeal to overthrow their regime, and
to have ^iven this paper to the general. 'I vrant you
to Icnow'V said Goerdeler, 'that I am ready to ta.ke full
personal responsibility for my actions and that I am
v/illing to risk my life in this struggle.' Goerdeler
did so —and lost his life."
3) Underscoring sapplled,
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^VSIZSAECICEE's attitude at ^he tine of the Stalingrad disaster is
even more strickingly revealed in one of the Etzdorf notes introduced "by
the Prosecution as Sbdiihit 3611 NC-5413, Doc^Bki 97 C. This paper is
no±. an official document, not drafted to impress Sihhentrop or other
i^azis with arguments proposed in their own language, "but is, instead,
a secret note written "by the "secret liaison man" "betireen the two "con
spirators", Holder and WBIZaiSCKER. Said Herr von Btzdorf in refund to
these handwritten notes:
"I hoped that the Gest-'^ po would not find them..."
(Tr. ne-ge 9638)
This Exhibit 3611 quotes WEIZS^CKER's message to Haider as stating:
"G-lad that the situation at the front will consolidate.
The conquest of Baku will hit the Russians on the head
since it is their main source of oil. The military effort
should not relent under any circunstajices.
"The probloma.tica.l nature of the war against England
"The other side has decided and signed not to make
peace with Hitler* In order t.o change their ninds one
would have to deal out decisive blows. This is hardly
possible in the Middle Eo.st and in Affcica; therefore
the ompho-sis must bo "on the Atlantic and the General
Staff should note this...
"One would have to destroy England's hopes in Sussia
to make them see that the xvar is not worth while. One
would further ha'"''e to make the English realize that
one can talk with us..."
The phrase ""in order to change their minds one would have to deal
out decisive blovrs" is also obviously \CH!IZSA.BOICER's true ansv/er to the
"Hnconditioml Surrender" formula proclaimed In Ca.sablanca in January
1943 which he now claina foiled the efforts of the resistance.
(by Er. Becker.) "In connection with this Stolin-
grad cata-stronhe, in spite of all this, why, then
wasn't it possible for any expansive and signifi
cant oueration to go into action ag^.inst -litler?
A. (by irSIZSAECJ(ER) "It w-s not possible for the
reason that in January of 1943, at the meeting
of Casablanca, the formula of unconditional sur
render was established and proclaimed. It is my
•conviction that this formula which protrac.ted
the war to an incredible decree, I would say
urotractod it for tvm years*" (Tr. uage 7915)
And he ex;:oouds this thesis further:
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If.
;«•
".♦•At V6ry nonont for which the respective per
sons had prepe.red for years in painstaking endeavors,
and to v/hich they had looked forward, at that very
moment, hy means of this declaration all hopes for
political achievements were struck out of their ha.nds
"because what military leader vrould take over the re-
sponsihility for brining about a revolution if the
cha.nces th^t he held for Germany weren't any better
or more adveutageous than the chances that Hitler him
self had njijA^ay?" (Tr. pages 7916 - 7917)
The fact that is not speaking for the G-erman resistance
with this theory is evidenced by the fact that the majority of actual
attempts to overthrow the ITpzl regime took place after the Casablanca
conference and finally culminated in the abortive putsch of July 20,
1944, Very shortly after Casablanca the courageous attempt on Hitler's
life by one of the defendant's witnesses, Pabian von Schlabrendorff,
took pla.ce on 13 March 1943. (Tr. pages 10547 - 19548)
at best,
Thusylt was fea-r of total defeat and "unconditional surrender" wh '^-
_ others
Ti/EIZSAji;CKEH con^sne^iheregig^ance eEfertspQf^. This is in striking con
trast to "principles of moral affirnp.tion beyond merely political
exigencies" - "the spiritual forces of resistance" - which S^ns Hothfels,
in his book 2.)^ asserts as the true motives of the genuine German re
sistance.
In order to show that he sabotaged the Hazi aims the defense
makes claims, too numerous to cite here in detail, that Herr von ^iTElZ-
SAHCKSH saw to it that young men, with whom he was closely associated,
were retained in the German ^orcign service. These men were also enga.ged
in "resistance" - they vrere to /^thor secret information and make con
tacts with the Allies, V^SIZSAECIlSH himself -puts it this wa.y:
"... Outwardly, towards the outside, we worked on the
tasks assigned to us but in fact, within this organi-aation
one could build uu a front of one's own.
"...I wanted and Intended to keep the basic stock or
personnel ready for action at the moment when Hitler
should no longer be there. In this intervening -period
I sent people I trusted to important position,..They
had various tasks, ^he most important was that one
snould be able to rely on these ueo-ole absolutely in
our work for -Deace. In the few -points and locations taken
for these reasons alone, it was still -oossible to carry
on interna,tiona.l conversations. The threads could not
be allowed to break.
Hans Hothfels, op.clt,, page 12
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They \7ore the points of support for the couriers
of the resistance ^oTeinent, conini:; from horaet and they
were sources of infomatioUe Through then it ^^.5 -nossihle
to find out whether and when the eneray side night ho pre
pared to show preparedness to negotiate with a non-Hitler
Gemany. These men v/ere indispensahle to the resistance
novenent."
The only place in vrhich these friends of ^TSIZSAZC'CSR In their testi
mony and affidavits actually allege to have sounded out the Allies in
the sense doscrihed hy the defendo.nt ahove was Berne, There can he no
ojuestion that any of them - Kessel, ITostiz, Krauh^.,Siegfried, Solzanr,
Blankenhom, "^elhagen, Melchers, or vfhatever their names may he -
acted as couriers for the Oerman resistance. Allen Welsh Dulles, who
was, after all, on the receiving end of these activities during the
war, describes his secret contacts v/ith the German resistance in de-
to.il in his hook, "Germany's Underground". The na.nes of secret couriers
which he mentions have no connection vrhatsoever with these friends of
!7EIZSAECKBH who found pleasant assignments in Svitzerland. The actual
contact men of the German resistance would, in fact, stay as far away
as possihlc from the official German Legation.
We need not go into the allegation which Herr von Kessel and
others made as to their secret contacts made on hehalf of !V3IZSA3CJCEIl.
One of the defendant's own witnesses, ^hoodor "Cordt, antly describes
the Berne atmosphere:
Berne is a small city of one hundred twentyfive
thousand people, v/here, especially in time of war
the dimloma.tic corps plays a particularly imoortant
mart. In this capital of a neutral country most states
in the world, including the pov/ers with the exception
of the Soviet Union were represented by diplomatic
missions. Of__Ci2,urce,_it is_nbvious_t^at i.n_sucli S,
t.h^r^ wa^ o. hu^y_o^cl^i.ngo iif_infjirraaii^n_and__0Tiiriii2n^
beiwGon ihe mi^sionsj, (Tr, mage lpa75)
"Ho, one actually cannot speak about ne.gotlations in
the strict sense of the word. I h'^ve already mentioned
the fact that these ne/5:otiatians had come to a stop.
As serious negotiations as those with Mr, Cornwall
Svana never again occured." (Tr, m?^ge 12277)
Heithar the alleged negotiations nor any of lOlIZSAEOICEE's other
attempts to sabotage Hazi ailas came to anything in contrast to his
continued and ceaseless efforts to further these alms In his ovrn field
of activity. In fact, analysis of the evidence submitted to support
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tho.extravagant clains of resistance can only confirm the view of
Lord Vansittartwho
"..always considered, and still consider (s)
Baron von the chief executant of
Ribhentrom's policy. I can recall nothing
that made me "believe or suppose tha.t Baron
von '^ '/EIZSASCI{ER used his position to hinder
these calamitous courses."
(HG~5786, Exh. C-65 A, Doc. Bk. 204)
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8* "Hesistanca" at the Vatican
As tha German disaster at Stalingrad -was
followed by tha dafeat in Africa, and a.s the continous
air-raids over Germany removed the hopes for "final vic
tory", the German opposition began at last to take heart
and efforts were intensified. But Herr von re
moved himself from the scene of action and served the
Fuehrer at the Vatican.
'j\"^JIZ3a3CKFH now cluims that his decision to go to
the Vatican was also prompted by "resistance" motives. ^el
von dem Busche testified for him as follows:
the
"V'/ell, he said/focal point of German policy
vi/ould be outside Germany and this focal point
for technical and other reasons seemed to be
the Vatdc.an because in the Vatic.-n there were
the missions of other nations with whom one
could have discussions and on the other hand,
there was the supernational authority of the
Vatican which was a tremendous reality in a
period when there was chaos."
(Tr. page 1097S)
The defendant or his friends make no claims at
all of having carried on any discussions vd.th the missions
of other nations in contrast to, for instance, Hans von
Dohnanyi, who was murdered by the Nazia for his part in
the anti-Hitler plot and vjhose vjidovj tells us that her hus
band "was constantly trying to use Roma as a basis to get
in contact with the V-estern powers and with the opposition
groups within Italy". (vmzSAFCKFR Document 291, Exhibit
244) D.B.5)
1) The defense witness von SchlabreMo'rfi'a'.':- in direct exami
nation deplored this movo.' by v/TIZSAFCKFR as a logical
consequence of his previous testimony:Q,(by Dr. Becker. As you know, IVir. von V'eizsaacker was assig
ned to the Vatican in 1943% 'hat was tha reaction of you
and your friends and yourself to this step?
A. V'/e who tow - Bar on von ^"eizsaecker's convictions regretted
this step very much, as far as our struggle against Hit
ler was concerned.
Q, Iiill you please explain oriefly what you have Just said?
A. Baron w'^IZSAFCK'TR in the post of State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs was an important support for the German
resistance movement, 'hen the change in his post came we
lost this support. (Tr. page 10545)
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Not 3ven during those last hectic days of
and
the war whan Hitlers most ardent followajs broke away/be
trayed their Fuehrer in tha hopa of saving what was left
of their country^ did ^.-FXhSaFCKFR attempt to act on behalf
of his "resistance" and "pe^ce" alms vjhich he now claims
to have persuad all along. It is strange indeed that the
surrender of the German armies in Italy should have been
negotiated with Himmlar's erstwhile adjutant, SS-Obar-
gruppea fuehrer Wolff and a number of othar people.
WFIZSAECKFR, however, who^because of his position at the
Vatican, if for no othar reason, would have been the na
tural and logical choice for carrying on clandestine ne
gotiations with the Allies^had no"% connection whatsoever
with this event. It saved countless lives and hastened
the end of the war•
Tha entire legend of ".FIZSAFCKTR's "resi
stance" so elaborately constructed by tha Defense as a
factor of mitigation for the defendant's conduct is sum
marized in TRIZSA^K^ "^hibit 4, ('.bizsa-ecker Document
169 D.B. lA ) the alleged "diary" of Carl Burckhardt.
Hitler's State Secretary, we are to be believe, was in
reality.-jcot the chief executor of the Nazi calamity in
the fiid of foreign policy but was, instead, the "Talley-
rand"of recent German history.
"He came a little closer. 'There is," he
continued, very softly, iona man - you
know him - who is trying to play this
most difficult game 5 he is a German pa
triot and in his way internationally Euro
pean; with adfairable energy he is doing
everything to prevent the war; nobody can
catch him on anything, nobody can prove
anything against him; the only thing which
might endanger him is the carelessness
the naivete, and the indiscretion of the
so-called conspirators the man I mean,
you know, 'and he whispered, "Weizsaecker;
his .aim is the same as mine - to prevent,
prevent, prevent I "
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Tharo has baan considarabla controversy on
tha admissability of these mamcir^s, Carl Burckhardt's
own declaration of August 27, 1948, is compataly da-
void of propar ..authentication. Ha himself doas not con-
tand that his recently written and only partly cora-
platad "Memclns", submitted only in photostats, are
identical with the contents of the "sheets of paper"
allegedly written .;oout ten years ago and unavailable
to this Tribunal. In fact, his own deeLaration shows
that they are not identical but instead are a later
amplification and literary elaboration of the alleged
notesf .
The Defense argued the admissability of this
interesting historical speculation by comparing it with
the
other original documents which h-.ve been accepted,/kal-
for instance,
dor Diaries and "Ttzdorf .notes,/towever, no comparison
is possible because the Haider and .Ttzdorf p.ipars are
complete contemporaneous documents5 the former in Hai
der's own shorthand, the latter in the writer's own
longhand.- Both are recording frocts and both wore af
firmed by the author in due legal process,. In contract,
tha Burckh..rdt excerpts , are his own conclusions
and interpretations which allegedly have a few "sheets
of paper" as their basis,^
If indeed saw hiiiiself in the role
of a modern Talleyrand all one can say, upon considering
the gruesome sequence of events which have bean un
folded before this Tritaunal^is that - in contrast to
Talleyrand - he remained unsuccessful. But an historical
rnalysis of Burckhardt's notes shows clearly that nei
ther he himself nor the late Fascist ambassador Attolico
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actually ascribad this rola to him. Two facts, allegedly
written down by Burckhardt in 1939 > not exist at this
time at all but devaibpgiL^ only three to four years later.
Thus Burckhardt sets off
against ambassador von Hassalls"Ha (Hassel) talks and uses
abusive .languagaj ha always wants to dictate to the Eng
lish ... This was allegedly said by Mussolini's ambassa
dor "In November 193^" Yet, it is obviously deduced from
the alleged reason", given by •••'TIZSATCKIR, for the break
in the intiraate relations between von HaaseHand the State
Secretary. However, this break did not occur until April
1942 (-Exhibit C-288, KG - 5759 D.B. 204 A) and prior to
that time the two men were the closest of friends. Has-"
sels's diary, which is most extensive, does not record
that anyone, least of all WHI2i3ATCKi;H, criticized him for
too much talking. In fact Hassall at the time under dis
cussion had just left his post as Hitler's ambassador in
Rome -(he was dismissed in Spring 1938) and had in no
way entered lato the difficult conspiracy which later re
sulted in his cruel daath.
It is likewise difficult to understand how
Attolico could - on the alleged date (1939) - he tal
king about an anti-Hitler conspiracy when rill socholars of
the German opposition to Hitler agree that the conspirLacy
did not take root until much later.
Another historical error in Burckhardt's
essay seems the statement that "Prague was already too
much . . . before Prague uVTIZci-iHCKHR also did everything
to persuade Hitler uo adhere to the Munieh agreements."
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Hitler did nor march into Prague until March 1939 Q^d
the "diary" is exeedingly hazy as to the date on which
this remark was allegedly made* The record shows that
W;^IZSA'nX3KHR did everything in hi^ower to prevent the
implementation of the Munich agreement by preventing
the (fJestarn Powers from ratifying their guarantees to
Czechoslovakia*
\
A few lines further down Burckhardt speaks
of Schulenburg and Moltke as misguided anti-Nazi con
spirators* The ambassador Count ^''erner von der Schulen
burg, although executed later in connection with the
July 20, 19^4 plot, was at that time^ when Burckhardt no-bes
^vere allegedly wmttenjenjoying his diplomatic hey-day
preparing for the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact* And if Count
Fritz von der Schulenburg should be the one referred to -
he was, in November I938, a deputy to the infamous
Count Helldorf, the SA leader and police president of
Berlin. The younger Schplanburg's dissidence from
v;'as not
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apparent until four years later® Likewise did Count Hsllmut von
Moltlo's oppositional activity not beooms apparent imtil the sum
mer of 1941 It would have been more than prophetic, indeed,
for anyone to state as early as November 1938 that these two sub
sequent conspirators "can only end tragically," It seems a finrther
contradiction to state of ITeizsaeoker that "lie is the onty one,"
Did the Defense not try to establish that he cooperated closely
with the " move me nt" ?
To^^.y5f€iiiid or no 'Talleyrand', as the foregoing brief shows
what evidence was submitted to show "iTillZSLjlCKilR* s participation
in a bona fide resistance movement collapses like a house of cards
because of its inherent contradictions. The mai^ factual, real
actions of iTeizsaeclor on behalf of the Hitler regime speak for
tliense Ives •
T/hen on July 20, 1944, the actual German resistance struck at
last, vra hear no more about von VallZ&'j-jlGKjlR's opposition or par
ticipation, Following the abortive attempt on Hitler's life tls
festr.po swiftly moved in and investigated every person who was
even faintly connected with any of the conspirators. The conspi
rators themselves were dragged before the People's Coin:ts and
were executed or imprisoned. Attempts were made by several people
at the time, including even liussolini, to intervene on behalf of
one or the other of the prominent and highly esteemed persons who
were condemned to death for tlieir part in the conspiracy against
Hitler, But Eerr von h'illZSAJCKiin, although he, himself, in the
safety of Vatican City, n5V3r moved a finger to aid any of the men
1) see Hans Rothfels, Op, oit,, p« 112
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who ha now claims wars his -friends and co-conspirators. Instead, ha
continuad to sarva tha same Hitlar whosa vfrath liquidated practically
evarything and averybody that was allagadly dear to him. Had TGIZ-
at that tima, given soma indication that ha, too, balongad
to that othar, batter Gsrmany, it could not have brought him any
physical harm.
Neither of tha two men, still among the living, who partici
pated in tha aDdiaustive Nazi investigation of the anti—Hitler plot, .
have corns across any evidence wiiich would link TiTJIIZSAjlClCSR to tha
conspiracy or prove his participation in tha pracading planning or
preparations. (NG-5405, .Sxhibit 3604,. D.B. 970, and N(j-5376,
\
jjxiiibit 3603, D.B.. 970.)H3 was never char gad with,. nor suspected
of anything - contrary to the affidavit by Schroadar (V/i5IZS/JJCKSR
Document 146, ilxliibit 279, D.B. 5) who is not abla to give ary
convincing details. And tte affidavit of ona Gustav Adolf Sonnanhol,
(Jxh. 266) according to which '.'SIZSAilOKJIR was to have been betrayed
to tlis Gsstapo b^/" Adam von Trott zu Solz collapsed completely under
cross-examination (Tr.page 18449), If T7j!IZSiliiCK3R would hava had
to fear suspicion oftar it wa.s known that not only ths plotters but
their families and relatives as well wera put into concentration camps
in wiiat ths Nazis called "Sippenhaftung", .Frau von T/j;IZSAJlOKJIS. could
not hava baan so incredibly naivo as to inquire wl^thor liar journey
to Garmany would be welcome. Sciiroedar also tails of an order "by
Ribbentrop to investigate tha activities at tha Vatican Umbassy —
but apparantly no suspicious activity was ravaalad on the part of
either V/jlIZSRjlOFjR or Kassel for naitliar wqs racallad nor repri
manded. Superfluous to say that IVaizsaack3r*s son had to admit
binder crossexamination that no Gestapo has molastad ary of the Tfeiz-
saecl<3r»s relatives in Germany, wl-^en after tha July Putch against
Hitler a manliunt started against all anti-Nazis vrho had the
slightest contact with the anti-Hitler plotters.
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But, 3van if vs assume that Schroador's allegation is corract
to tha effaot that although under suspicion hy tlis
Nazis, was not raeallad hacause it would attract attention "and
ore had to faar that in that a vent ha would gp ovar to the Allies
opanlj''", why did his sons and his properly, avan his files, remain
unmolestad by tlie Gestapo? The Nazis, aftar tha 20th July affair,
did not in tha least hesitate to try parsons in absentia and to
arrest the family members of suspects as hostages© Thus the young
a.nd innocent sistar of one of Dohnaryi^s friends, Jlrich Maria Ver-
\
mehren, who had gone ovar to the Allies in the fall of 1943, was
arrested and put into a concentration camp©^^ Tha widow of Hans
Bernd von Haeftan statas in the affidavit which she gave for
T/3IZS/JlCKjffi. ("iTjJIZSiiJIOKSR Document 244, Exhibit 2 61, D.B© 5) that
she also was "under arrest for a rather long period and the Central
Goimiiitfcae of Victims of Fascism" in Berlin has recognized me as
a "Victim of Fascism''V,Tha same was true of the widows and re
latives of a great number of othar a.nti-Nazi conspirators© The Ge
stapo even arrested tlie minor grandchildren of cunbassador von
Hassell, in addition to his wife and daughter, and put them into
Nazi foster homes under assumed names© And Berr "3IZSivjlCESil should
have been spared these crualtias even though ha was under suspicion
By Hibbontrop and tlie Gestapo? (see Tr• pages 9236 —9238)©
T)~Isa~VernBhr3n, "Reisa durch den Letzten Al<t^
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VJjJIZSAjJOICJIR, who salf-rightoously dofios tha sinistor facts
and in dafansa of his criminal tehaviour, axploits to tlia last ths
couragaous actions of othsrs Yfhc gava thair livas for a causa,
which lia navar sharad is thus in sharp and most unfavorablo contrast
to ona whom ha claims was his friand, Alfrad Haushofar* Haushofar
was convictad of ra si stance to the IJaziragima and was murdered
l:y tha ragima which 7i'i;igsAj!CIIC3Il sarvad so wall. But STTsn in his death
cell he contamplatad tha tragedy of his generation and 1:©, whose
deeds vera radaemad by death, realized and admitted his ovm com
plicity and guilt. His guilt was not that for v;hich Fraisler's court
hovd convicted him, but:
"ilarly I sav;- tlia misery^ s vdicla coursa - I spolo ny
warning, but not harsh enough nor claori Hov/ guilty .
I hava'bean I novr know loera
ly AlbracTit Haushofar, "^Moa-bitor Sonnetta", as quoted by ATlen
Vr, Dulles, Op* Cit*, page 123,
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APPilNDIX A " Chart shov-ring Affidavits givan and raooivod by
soms m3mb3rs of tl:© vTSIZSiiJJGKilR Groupo
WanD /iffidavits givsn
for dofandants
Nostiz
Bruns
1,70izsaackar
367
a2 6
230
2B7
406
408
432
Stsangracht 7
17oa rmann
Jlxh. 27
Tib izsaackar
2)xh«
433
(discussed with
I Ka s201j ilrich Kordt
Pbcbrsr
I JJtzdorf
! Dr,
(Tr. 1842 6
Siagfriad
(discussad with
lOl 'vVaizsaoclor Jr.)
155 i
364 :
258 j
2 68 '
COivod
i'lffidavits givsn | /iffidavits ro-*
for £ef81133 lYitnassas in axchangs from
T/a izsaackar
iJrich Kordt
17a izsaackar
^ohnuxxQ ;
Dr»--ilrich Kordt
Herv;aj5th .rf.
Dr, Jans
Walthor
Schmidt • :
Transcr#
page
18423
1 •and
i 18439
18474
Sonnla ithner '"Eatvraen ona ore twoi iraizsaaclor 18474
; u0 izsaackar •dozo n" 7s . Staangrachlj 18479
; Cxh. 19 :(Tr. PS, 18479) Rittar ;
! 114 •1 2rich Kordt '
! 293 1 2tzdorf '
! 3 j Bruns
Staangracht ' 1i
Doc. 48 ' !
73
107 1
• 422 i
i 17oarmann ,
•' Cxho 21 ;
Hittar
ilxh. 4
35 i
; 53 .
j Vaasanmayar !
1 Bk, 5-G
1
Alton-
;
Vie izsaackar i (discussad with iVaizscackar 17601
burg /iff. 43 • von Braun) Kordt (?) 1
i 45 1 Grave nitz i
I 73 [ Vogal 1
1 81 i Grail
1 86 .
Rittar 2xh« 154
Vaasanmayar i
Doc. 137 ;
Staangracht '
Doc. 31
Kopplar 2x11.108
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-k "fmi •-
}^"5
Nans AffidaTits Affidcivits gi-wsn
for defandants i for Dofonsa "Jit-
m SSQS
Korbort not quastio-
, ri3d
Kanci^^ 1 for ".'©izsaa
^ dor "a few"
'ucermann
2 for St33n-
Thao i Testamor^
Kordt i
iJrioh, Tostimor^
Kordt'
discussed affi
davit with
Nostiz (Tr. page
1842 6)
Von Dcernborg
Frenze 1
Truatzschlor
H© SS9
Hanclo pg
Affidavits r©
C3a?v©d in' 3X-
chang3 from
Voga 1
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APP3NDIX B
affidavits dsalh^g with
WSIZSAFCKER' b "RSSISTANCE«
^ ^
Not all the numerous affidavits introduced on
'behalf of Weizsaecher could be dealt ^^Ith in the main
part of this brief. For just as they intentionally
clutter up and obscure the main issues of this trial
as a v'hole they would merely clutter up and obscure
the histo-nioal facts which this brief attempts to
clarify.
Hence, a number of affidavits introduced in the
Document Book which the Defense hopefully calls
Weizsaecker's "Resistance" (Defense Document Book No.
5) are "briefly summarized in this appendix.
For the convenience of the Court this a.ppendix
is grouped in four categories: (1) Affidavits by
what might be called ^ona fide members of the German
resistance or their widows, (Z) Character affidavits,
(3) Affidavits dealing with the defendant's religious
sympathies, and (4) Affidavits dealing with Welzsaecker's
position as the Vatican.
(1) Affidavits by Wi5:2Zff
Survivors of the German
Resistance
Affidavit by Kargarethe von Ease
Welzsaecker Document 148
Exhibit 275, Doo, Bk. 5
The affiant, states th?.t Welzsaecker had political
discussions with her husband, the then ililita.ry Commander
-66-
ir'AUm .^4 - • -"rtViliTi•' iir'ArV'
•It
of Serlin, She learned from her hushand that the
defendant held a.ntl-Nationalsocialiat views and "did
everything in his power to try to change Hitler's
foreign policyo
Affidavit by Countess Schwerin von Schwanenfeld
Weizsaecker Document 141
Sxhibit 252, Doc. Bk. 5
The affidavit asserts tho,t Count Schwerin von
Schwanenfeld, an early critic of Hitler, ojid his circle
of friends were "in constant touch with Herr von
Weizsaecker through a middleman, Herr von Kessel, a
first cousin of my husband's".
It is not difficult to assume that the sojne
relationship had existed if the Count had entertained
different political views.
Affidavit by Dr. Karl Stroelin
Weizsaecker Document 86
Exhibit 253, Doc. Bk, 5
Hitler's Reich did not tolerate as Lord Mayors of
large cities men other than confirmed Nazis. Toward
one of them, the affiant, Weizsaecker expounded his
well-known but in no way secret gospel that there
could be no pea.ce lest Hitler was removed.
The fact that affiant used this information to
renew his connections with Coerdeler and to persuade
Field Marshal Rommel to Join an anti-Nazi conspiracy
can, even if we .assume them to be true, hardly be
ascribed to the efforts of the defendant.
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P^^fidCwVit by C3^a3dl;ta von Trott zu Solz
Weizsaecker Document 228
iJxhlblt 265, Doc. Bk. 5
'J^he vldov of Adam von Trott zu Solz in this
affidavit spends of the high personal esteem in which
her husband held the defendant and asserts that beca.use
of that "it seems almost unbearable to me to know, that
Herr von Weizsaecker.should be one of the main defen
dants. "
Affidavit by Klothilde Bruecklmayer
Waizsaecker Document 362
Exhibit 264/ Doc, Bk, 5
This affidavit, without giving any precise state
ments, reiterates in general terms as information
received from the affiant's late husband the essence
of Welzsaecker's defense. The affidavit can therefore
be considered as having been dealt with in the afore
going brief.
Affidavit by Hans Bernd G-isevius
Weizsaecker Document 368
Exhibit 255, Doc. Bk. 5
Gisevius, a member of the inner circle of the
resistance movement which culminated in the abortive
putsch of 20 July 1944, should if anyone, be able to
give rather precise Information as to the defendant's
relationship to an anti-Hitler conspiracy. However,
since such facts do not exist, Gisevius gives interest
ing information on the anti-Hitler conspiracy but little
on Weizsaecker, Particularly astounding is the assertion
that "during a discussion with Weizsaecker which took
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mplace in the 'oet;inning of 1943" the State Secretary
explained his three "basic deas dealing with the
prevention of war which had broken out more than three
years earlier.
G-lsevius considers it a matter of special merit
that Weizsaecker "protected" Srich Kordt and Consul
Albrecht von Kessel. The former having been in the
Far 2a,st and the latter in Switzerland and both being
presumably able diplomats it can hardly be s-aid that
these men were in need of any special "protection"..
The affiant draws attention to what he wrote in his
book "To the Bitter End", However, no activities of
von Weizs-aecker are mentioned in this book v/hlch gives
information on the actions of many other persons.
(2) Character Affidavits
Affidavit by Ferdinand Sauerbruch
Weizsaecker Document 347
Exhibit 277, Doc. bk. 5
The famous surgeon gives a very flattering character
description of the defendant and proceeds that Weizsaecker
was opposed to a G-erm.an invasion of Switzerland and once
assisted the affiant i^hen he was in trouble with the
Gestapo. Dr. Sauerbruch "can not understand how such
a decent man ... can today stand accused as a war
criminals"
Affidavit by Adolf Velhagen
Weizsaecker Document 271
Exhibit 259, Doc. Bk. 5
Velhagen, who was 35 years at the time, claims to
have exhaustively learned of Weizsaecker's political
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attitude and secret endeavors during a three week
period at which he substituted as the State Secretaries
personal secretaryc Particularly noteworthy is his
claim that Weiasa.ecker treated with "undisguised
dista.ste and contempt those old civil serva.nts in
the Foreign Service who made common cause with National
Socialism and partly were occupying very high positions,"
The affiant does not conclude, however, that Weizsaecker
suffered of self-contempt.
Affidavit by Dr.. Herbert Siegfried
Weizsaecker Document 337
Exhibit 257, Doc, Bk, 5
The personal secretary of the defendant in this
affidavit confirms that a number of persons mentioned
frequently during the course of Weizsaecker's defense
came to see him on occasion. The affiajit tells nothing
about the nature of the conversations that were held.
It must be remembered that the anti-Nazi conspiracy wns
not a full time job and that all the persons mentioned
had official duties which vjere bound to bring them into
contact with the State Secretary. As as well -'known -P
Weizsaecker also entertained official contacts with
Party leaders and ardent Nazis,
In addition the affiant states that Weizsaecker
had his rooms checked for hidden monitoring equipment.
Apparently none was found. As far as tapping of wires
is concerned, it is common knowledge that in the Third
Reich all wires were tapped occasionally. The SD or
Security Service, in fact, was initially established
as an inter-party intelligence agency with the task to
si^y on the party leaders themselves. Weizsaecker himself
used material, obtained through wire-tapping, in the
interest of the Reich.
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Herr Siegfried in this affidavit also brings up
the estrangement between von Hassell and Weizsaeckor.
Weizsaecker ^Ith his close ties to the Gestapo learned
that Hassell v;a.s under suspicion and did not want to
get involved in an anti-Nazi conspiracy which wa§ not
in accordance with his convietions« This becomes quite
evident from the diaries of the late German ambassador in
Rome.
(3) dealing with
Weizsaecker_[s £eli£i2Hs
sympathies
Affidavit by Dr. ilugen Gerstenraayer
Weizsaecker Document 270
Exhibit 243j Doc. 3k. 5
Gerstenmayer states in effect that Weizsaeck<^r and
his friends assisted in the maintenance of inter-church
relations of the German Protestant Church with the
World Council Churches.' Such relations were never
considered illegal by the Nazi state and it is hard to
understand why this action should be considered "an
attempt to protect the resistance movement against
National Socialism".
Affidavit by Dr. F, Siegmund-Schulze
Weizsaecker Document 275
Fxhlbit 262, Doc„ Bk, 5
In this same category also belongs the affidavit
by Prof. Dr. F. Siegmund-Schulze, a German refugee who
knew weizsaecker during his stay in Berne and who
relates essentially the snme facts as does Pastor
Gerstenmayer.
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Affidavit by Karl Barth
Weizsaecker Document 353
Exhibit 242
The famous theologian called Weizsaecker "a gentleman
of pure character". The fact that he sympathized with
the church opposition in Germany at that time berars no
relation to the criminal activities with which he is
charged. At that time many high government officials
in Nazi Germany sympathized with the Protesto.nt Church
which was then under attack by the Nazi created rival
"German Church". In the end the -official church won
out and was not seriously molested any longer^ except when
courageous churchmen, like Pastor Niemoeller^ critized
the Government. Nazi officials in sympathy with the
Church then included Traffic Minister Eltz von Ruebenach
who resigned In protest against the persecution of the
Churchs in 1937, one year before Weizsaecker became
Ribbentrop's State Secretary.
Affidavit by Ernst Brandenburg
Weizsaecker Document 345
Exhibit 245, Doc, Bk. 5
The essence of this affidavit as far as it relates
to the defendnnt directly at all is that Weizsaecker
during a dinner in 1937 advocated a revisionist policy
in respect to National Socialism,
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w(4) Affidavits dealing ^^ith
WeizsaeckerJ^s position
at the Vatican
Affidavit hy Dr. Georg Viktor Bruns
Weizsaecker Document 15
flxhibit 858, Doc, Bk. 5
Dr. Bruns, a member of Hlbbentrop's !iinisterial
Bureau, asserts that he kept the State Secretary
continuously informed on the goings on in ^^ibbentrbp's' '
vicinity. To what ends '.Veizsaecker utilized this
information must be regarded as conjecture.
Although von Kessel was to be the liaison man
between Weizsaecker and the conspirators after the
defendant became ambassador at the Vatican (see tr.p,
10977) Bruns also claims to have acted in that capacity.
As evidence for this claim he cites coded letters which
he received from the defendant which ,are given elaborate
interpretations.
Bruns further states that "according to Weizsaecker^s
views, he was considered as belonging to the circle of
20 July conspir.ators. " This statement speaks for itself.
The fact that Weizsaecker was not molested or
dismissed from his post at the Votlcan is inadequately
explained by the fact "that the Allied occupation of
Rome made it impossible to recall Weizsaecker or have
him brought back to Germany as well as to send another
ambassador to the Vatican." It seems hardly feasible
that Hitler would let himself be represented at the
Holy See by a man whom he suspected of plotting his
assassination,
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\Affi^AVit by G-uenther von Bismark
Welzsaecker Document 150
Exhibit 278, Doc, Bk, 5
This affiant was a frequent guest at Weissaecker's
house in Rome in the fall of 1943 and claims to know
that the defendant although always "reserved in his
speech" i^evealed to him that only the elimination of
regime and an end to the war would justify his remaining
in office.
Affidavit by Dr. Wilhelm Melchers
Weizsaecker Document 17
Exhibit 260, Dqc, Bk. 5
Dr. Melchers merely confirms th-^t von Weizsaecker
helped to retain in office a number of younger officials
most of whom have testified on his behalf.
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9. LEG.a ..3PECTS OF_Tp^JPI^ OFJ'JEI^L^_;4®^ HpS''
KUSH'IBERG PRECEDENTS
The cr.se ?.t br.r is not the first one in y;hich the Nuernberg
Tribune.ls hr.ve been fr.cod v/ith the plee. of "resistr.nce" or "dual
nature".
(1) Jiff JUDGpNT
In the HIT Judg;".ient^ the decisions concerning the defondrnts
Soyss-Inquart (Volur.ie 1^ page 330)^von Neurath (Volujic I, ixge
336)j and Speer (Voluiao p<age 333) should be r.icntioned in this .
connection. In the case of Joyss-Inquartj the Tribunal v/as faced
ivith a defendant who_, involved by his official position in atrocities
corr.iitted in an occupied country, nevertheless in certain cases
opposed e^cbrcne .acasures and attenpted to reduce the nuifoer of
victiis. He was convicted and sentenced to death.
In the case of von Neurath, the Tribunal had to deal ^/ith a
defendant who claii.iod that he resigned fron the Office of iiinistcr
of Foreign .affairs upon boconing aware of Hitler's aggressive v/ar
plans, and that he took charrc again of the foreign affairs of
Nazi-Gornany onl;^ to proiiotc peaceful sottlor.cnt of pending issues;
noroover, thr.t as "Protector" of Bohei"da and lioravia, ho advised
a.vainst the atrocious policy inaugurated frori other sides, and
upon the failure of these his efforts, resigned fron his position.
The Tribuna.l considered those circivistances as nerely nitigatirig,
for it convicted hin and sentenced hir.i to fifteen years of Inpris-
onriont.
In the case of Spoor, the H'lT was faced with a defendant who,
in the last ptia.so of the war, actively opposed and even counter
acted Hitler's scorched earth policy orders. He was convicted and
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i.Qntencod. to twenty yenrs of ii:iprisoni.ient.
(i)_ TM JUSTICE a.3S_
In the Justice C-.se (Cnsc No. 3), the Tribunal touched upon
aspects :.iorG or less related to our subject natter in its decision
respectively concGrnin^^- the defendants Schle£;;clberi^'er, Lautz^
Joel and .jLtstoettcr. Schlopolbercer^ s plea thnt he did not
resign fron office before 1943 -ut of foar tha.t a worse nan would
take his place, did not save hin fron life inprisonrxnt (Case No. 3,
Trial Transcript Pages 10793^ 10794).
(3)„ H03T..GES_C^3E
In the Hostages Case (Case No. 7)^ the defendant General
Lanz "VTas sentenced to iaprisonnont for life in spite of the fact
tha.t he first had refused to carry out an atrocious superior order
and only obeyed it after, pursuant to his request, it had been
so r-nended as to roduco the nunber of persons affected as victins
(Case No. 7} Trial Transcript pp. 10535^10536). In the saiae case,
Ld.st, v;as sentenced to i'lprisoniaont for life, even though the
Tribunal gave sono credit to his plea of diseidenco \;ith the Nazi
rerino and that he attonptcd to nodorate the atrocious effect of
superior orders vfhich ho felt duty bound to car^'y out, finally,
tl"iat ho 7fas relieved fron the coniand upon his ovm request (Case
No. 7, Trial Transcript pp, 10479~lC4Sl). The Tribunal stated:
"These facts nay not be onployod, hov^ever, to free the defendant
fron, the responsibility for criies coi.mitted, •
. -"4 They
are natrrial-only to the extent that they bear upon the question
of nitigation of punishncnt." However, even in the last nontioned
respect, not tco nuch weight wa " given to thcj.i, it appears fron
the sentence.
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I4i ^EaS^.TZGRUCTN
In the Einsr.tzgru^^pGn Cnse_, str.tcnents of tho Tribunal,
iiorc or loss renotoly bearing upon our subject natter, nay be
found in the decisions respectively concerning the defendants
Ohlondorf, Jocst and Nosko, Ohlendorf was sentenced to death
in spite of his plea that he was in opposition to part of the
Nazi syston oven though ho went along with it in other respects.
The Tribunal gave this answer: "If the hur.icanitarian and the
Einsatz leader are nerged into one person, it could bo assumed
that are here dealing with a. cliaractor such as that described
by Robert Louis Stevenson in liis 'Dr. Jokyl and lir. H3''de
Is interesting as it would be to dwell on this possible dual
nature, tho Tribunal cm only nake its radjudication on tho
Ohlendorf who, by his own word, headed an orgmization wiiich,
according to its ov/n reports, killed 90^000 people.,,," (Case
No. 9, Trial Transcript pp. 6785^6786), This pica of "dual
nature" was quite similar to th?.t of \)EIZS.ECKER who, after being
faced -with his signature under documents connected vdth the
annihilation of r.iillions of Jows, stated: These v/ore docuj.ients
"which I would not touch in nor:ia.l times v/ith ny own h ndsi"
In the smic cp.so, tho defendmt Joost was given life in-
prisonment though the Tribunal seems to have oirtended sorae drcdit
to his pica of a particular kind of resistance, especially that
he opposed an atrocious superior order, in the execution of which
he v/as involved and that he wac-. therefore recalled and subjected
to disciplinary action (Case No. 9, Trial Transcript p. 679^-) •
Finally, Nosko was sentenced to imprisonnont for life in
spite of his plea, ap^:arently unrofuted, that upon his return
to Gorriany, froji his e:cfcermination mission abroad, ho successfully
protested ag.-.inst planned extermina.tion of Jews in a particular
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SGction of the Zone of Interior (Case No, 9* Trial Transcript
pp. 6S51,6fi52).
i.5j, J'vi^DIC^^C^oE _
The finclinrs in the Ilcuicp.l Case a^^r.inst the defendant
Sicvers is tix) one r.iost applicable to the case at bar against
VjHIZS.DCICER. Most of the defendants in the previous Nurnberg
oases who pleaded sone fora of resistance^ such as Scyss-Inquart
in the Netherlands^ von Neiirath in Czechoslovakia^ or the Generals^
Lanz and.List^ or the SS officers^ Ohlendorf, Jocst^ Noest_,
offered their resistance on the receiving crd of specific or
diroctival orders^, issued to thoj'i frora the law and dccree-mking
central govomncnt agencies in whoso plaruiing and policy-iuaking
they had no hand.
In contrast j Sievcrs in tho Ilodical Case like the defendant
VlEIZS.,SCKIilR^ and other defondcntB in this procoeding3_, belonged to
the Very 1. group v/ho v/orked in the key agencies in Berlin.
^ VJZIZS.JSCKj®^ likG the other defendants in this case, fomulated
^ and inploncnted the govorniaent policy of war crines and crlaes
against huiaanity which wcro executed by others.
The Siovors decision contains tlie follovojig findings, as to
resistance (Case No. 1 Trial Transcript pp. 11486,11487):"Siovorsi
second aatter of defense is oqually untenable. In support of the
defense Siov.rs offorod evidoncO by which ho hoped to prove that
as early as 1933 ho bocajao a r.iGr.boz' of a secret resistance nove-
nent which plotted to ovcrtlirovi) the Na.zi Gcvomncnt a.nd to
assassinate Hitler and Hir-i'jler; that as a loading Liea.ber of tho
group, Sicvers obtained the appointraent as Reich Business Liana.ger
of the Ihnencrbe so that ho could be close to Hir-inlGr and observe
his -iove:.ients; that in this position he becojio eniaoshed in the
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revolting; criiics^ the subject no.tter of this xndictLient: thr.t
ho ronodnod as Business lioaiagcr upon advice of his resistance
loader to .pain vital inforr.iation which v/ould hasten the day of
the ovorthroTf of the Nazi C-cvcmiaentj and the liberation of the
helpless peoples cor.iin.'j under its donination.
'Ussxu'aing;__a3,l_bhG5._._thjji.2;s ^o_b_e truOjj_ w_caPG.°t
ii fact roiiains that
nurders vjere coniiitted with cooperation of the ,duionerbe against
countless thousands of wretched concentration coup ini.iates who
had not tho slightest ncans of resistance, Siovers directed the
orograi".! by ivhich those nurders wore cor-i.d-ttcd,
is. IP'ii thad_p._^r£si_sjbanc_e_ wor^^^
coixdt^no cr:Laq,_^and.loapt^j>f all,. arain^.>ho_.^^^^ A®-
^U£,iqsGd to he_ j^rote^tjH^.jJ. (Underscorings adoed)
Siovers was found guilty cand scrtonced to death.
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